Hitler’s Diplomacy: Anschluss

Having highlighted Hitler’s diplomacy in “Hitler’s War”, I thought it might be useful to highlight Hitler’s diplomacy further, as well as returning to the theme of creating opportunities, by examining three further examples of Hitler’s diplomacy. So, I will examine the Anschluss, Munich and the negotiations that led to the Nazi-Soviet Pact. This piece will examine the Anschluss.

With the Austro-Hungarian Empire broken up by the Treaty of St Germain, there were those Austrians who saw union with Germany as their way back to the top table. But of course, both the treaties of Versailles and St Germain had forbidden that union. Hitler, however, was undeterred. This is what he had to say on the matter in Mein Kampf:

‘German-Austria must be restored to the great German motherland…. People of the same blood ought to be in the same Reich. The German people will have no right to look for colonies overseas until they have brought all their children in Europe together in one state.’^[1]

In 1934, Austrian Nazis, armed by Germany, had been conducting a reign of terror, blowing up railways, power stations and government buildings, as well as carrying out assassinations. The climax of all this was an attempted Anschluss (Union) in July, 1934 though it was badly bungled. The Austrian Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss, was murdered and the Chancellery seized by SS men dressed in Austrian Army uniforms. At the same time the radio station was seized and the news broadcast that Dollfuss had resigned. However, Austrian forces soon regained control whilst Mussolini mobilised four divisions on the Brenner Pass. Hitler quickly backed down.

As in 1923 and the Munich Beer Hall Putsch, Hitler realised he had acted too hastily and he learned the lesson well. Germany was not yet strong enough and was diplomatically too isolated. He would continue to rearm and would wait for better opportunities but, at the same time, he would need to preach peace. Hence his “peace speech” delivered to the Reichstag on May 21^st (noted in another “short piece”, ‘Opportunity and Diplomacy’) in which he said: ‘The principal effect of every war is to destroy the flower of the nation … Germany needs peace and desires peace!’^[2] and in which he specifically promised not to interfere with the internal affairs of Austria.

Mussolini’s break with Britain and France following his invasion of Abyssinia in October, 1935 and Hitler’s remilitarisation of the Rhineland only served to make Austria’s position more precarious. The new Austrian Chancellor, Dr Schuschnigg (who had replaced the murdered Dollfuss) was very aware of his weakened position, Italy was less likely to come to his aid if it moved towards an alliance, or even an accommodation, with Germany. And he couldn’t rely on support from France or Britain. Consequently, he began negotiations for a new treaty with the German minister in Vienna, none other than von Papen.

On the face of it, the treaty, signed on July 11th, 1936, seemed reassuring. For Germany formally affirmed its recognition of Austrian sovereignty and promised not to interfere in its internal affairs; whilst Austria promised to always conduct its foreign policy in the knowledge that it was ‘a German state’. It seemed a workable compromise. However, the treaty contained secret clauses: an amnesty for Nazi political prisoners in Austria (the party had been banned) and the appointment of representatives of the ‘National Opposition,’ i.e. Nazis, to positions of ‘political responsibility.’ 

Meanwhile, Mussolini was courted by Hitler and went to Berlin on a full state visit in September, 1937 dressed in a smart new uniform and treated regally to parades of the SS and the army, visits to armament factories, and lauded at a giant celebration in Berlin where a crowd of a million people heard Hitler heap praise on him and Mussolini himself received deafening applause. It was all intended to impress, and it did. Mussolini returned home convinced that Italy’s future lay with Germany. A year later, Hitler went to Rome.

With diplomacy doing its thing, throughout 1937, Austrian Nazis, encouraged and financed by Berlin, had increased their terrorist activities: violent Nazi demonstrations and almost daily bombings, and plans to assassinate Schuschnigg were discovered. Then, a government raid uncovered plans, initialed by Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s deputy, to stage an open revolt which would provoke a response from Schuschnigg which would, in turn, necessitate German intervention in order to prevent ‘German blood from being shed by Germans.’^[3]

Also throughout 1937 Schuschnigg had been in what he thought were confidential discussions with Arthur Seyss-Inquart, a Right-wing Austrian lawyer, a Nazi-sympathiser and Hitler’s lackey but without formal political ties. The two men worked out a series of concessions Schuschnigg would be prepared to make, should a show down with Hitler transpire. These included an increased role for National Socialists in the Austrian government and Seyss-Inquart’s own appointment as Minister of the Interior. But Seyss-Inquart passed the proposals to Hitler so that he had them in advance of any meeting with Schuschnigg, a meeting Schuschnigg was eager to have.

Despite having just been sacked, von Papen was sent back to Vienna to arrange a meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler (it was, in fact, von Papen’s own suggestion to do so). Schuschnigg agreed, having first been given assurances that the agreement of July the year before in which Germany promised not to interfere in Austria’s internal affairs would stand. However when the two leaders met in February, 1938 , Hitler made clear his intent: ‘I have a historic mission … who is not with me will be crushed.’ He accused Schuschnigg of Austrian bad-faith and threatened that unless he got his way, ‘the Army, my SA and Austrian Legion would move in, and nobody can stop their just revenge – not even I.’[4] (Hitler even pretended to call for General Keitel, Chief of the German Army High Command). It was a verbal assault unprecedented between two leaders of sovereign states, and Schuschnigg was not just taken aback, he was bullied into submission. Hitler, after all, seemed to have the cards stacked in his favour.

Schuschnigg was then presented with Hitler’s demands: the ban against the Austrian Nazi Party was to be lifted and those Nazi’s currently in prison given a full amnesty, including those who had murdered Dollfuss. Pro- Nazis were to be appointed to key posts, notably Minister of the Interior (Seyss-Inquart) with control over the police and security, Minister for War and Minister for Finance. The two armies were to establish closer relations and the Austrian economy was to be assimilated into the German economic system. Hitler demanded that he agree to all the terms within three days or else German forces would march into Austria.

Schuschnigg capitulated but pointed out that under the Austrian constitution it was in fact the President who had to ratify the terms, though he would recommend that he do so. Hitler, furious, accepted only to give Schuschnigg an extra three days: three days to send a ‘binding reply’ and three days to implement the terms. Wilhelm Miklas, the Austrian president, at first resisted the full thrust of the demands, but under the threat of armed intervention, he too felt he had no alternative but to accept them. In a speech to the Austrian parliament, Schuschnigg struck a defiant tone, ‘Thus far and no further.’ But Hitler had already shared his own thoughts to the Reichstag: ‘Over ten million Germans live in two of the states adjoining our frontiers … There must be no doubt about one thing…. It is unbearable for a world power to know there are racial comrades at its side who are constantly being afflicted with the severest suffering for their sympathy or unity with the whole nation, its destiny and its Weltanschauung.’^[5] Hitler had applied “diplomatic” pressure, both face-to-face and by means of his speech in the Reichstag (which, of course, was the Reichstag’s only reason for still existing).

Schuschnigg, in a last desperate attempt to save the situation, decided on a plebiscite. Hitler, however, determined to prevent it, decided on military intervention. The borders were closed by the Germans and rail traffic between the two countries halted, and with Austrian Nazi’s protesting on the streets of Vienna, and German troops rumoured to be concentrating on the border, Schuschnigg called off the plebiscite, only for Hitler to now demand his resignation. Schuschnigg yielded but President Miklas refused to accept Seyss-Inquart as his successor.

To legitimise the use of military force, Hitler had wanted Seyss-Inquart to send a telegram requesting German troops in order to restore order but, as there was no real disorder, Seyss-Inquart refused. He did ultimately agree to it being sent, but only after the order for the invasion had been given. Hitler had only been waiting for Mussolini’s approval and once that was given, Austrian independence was about to end. Still, Hitler had the veil of legitimacy he wanted as a precaution should Britain or France object too strongly.

A law providing for a total Anschluss, making Austria a province of the German Reich, was presented to the newly formed government on the very day on which Schuschnigg’s plebiscite was to be held.

Hitler had bullied his adversary to get what he wanted (this would become Hitler’s approach to “diplomacy”). He was able to do so because of the strength of his position: many Austrians wanted to merge with Germany anyway, he had the backing of Mussolini and Austria knew it didn’t have the backing from Britain and France that it needed, and if it came to war, the German army would crush the Austrian army if it stood up to them. And Hitler was not a man to miss an opportunity like that, not after he had schemed so hard to make it happen.

[1] Quoted in Andrew Hunt, ‘The Road to War’, p. 37

[2] Quoted in Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives, pp. 570-1 + William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 285-6

[3] Quoted in William L. Shirer, p.323

[4] Quoted in William L. Shirer, pp. 326-7

[5] Shirer, pp.332-3