Hitler’s Diplomacy: The road to Munich
Hitler viewed Czechoslovakia to be nothing more than an artificial creation of the Treaty of St Germain (he referred to it as ‘That bastard child of Versailles’). And for Hitler, all Germans living outside the Reich (and there were three million in the Sudetenland, part of Czechoslovakia), were referred to as the Auslandsdeutsch, Germans but not living in Germany, and he wanted them included in the Volksgemeinschaft, his people’s community. Before the rise of Hitler there was no serious nationalist movement in the Sudetenland but in 1933 the Sudeten German Party (the SDP) was formed and it was not long before it was under the direction of Berlin.
During 1938, Hitler would clarify his objective: nothing less than the destruction of Czechoslovakia (which, of course, meant more than the Sudetenland). Propaganda and diplomacy was the foundation stone of his strategy, creating an issue and increasing the violence of protests in the Sudetenland, and positioning himself as the defender of Sudeten German rights, thereby giving justification for action (the same tactics which he had applied in Austria). Britain and France, for their part, pressured the Czech government to grant far-reaching concessions. But those concessions would never be enough, Hitler and the SDP would see to that. As Konrad Henlein, the SDP’s leader, commented, ‘We must always demand so much that we can never be satisfied.’[1] These demands culminated in the eight-point Karlsbad Programme, a set of demands that would virtually give autonomy to the Sudetenland.
Meanwhile, towards the end of May, 1938 General Keitel sent Hitler a new draft of the plans for an invasion of Czechoslovakia which he had requested. But for Germany to act, either developments within Czechoslovakia would be needed to force the issue or else political events elsewhere in Europe would need to create a favourable opportunity. An unprovoked sudden attack was rejected. But Hitler had outlined what could unfold: ‘diplomatic controversies and tension’ that could be ‘exploited so as to shift the war guilt on the enemy’ was one option. The other, a ‘lightening action as the result of a serious incident’ subjecting ‘Germany to unbearable provocation’ so that it ‘affords the moral justification for military measures.’[2]
Hitler also spoke to the Hungarian ambassador to make clear that Germany had no interest in the Slovak region and that if Hungary wanted to recover the territory lost in the Treaty of Trianon it would be up to them to act. With regard to Italy, Hitler used his return visit to Rome in May to assure Mussolini that Germany had no ambition with regard to the South Tyrol and the large German population that lived there (the South Tyrol bordered Italy).
The scenario the British and French could see unfolding was that if the Czech government wouldn’t give in to the Sudeten-German demands, trouble in the region would increase and British and French troops would be called on to defend Czech sovereignty. For Britain the Sudetenland was not worth such a high price and though the French remained concerned about German resurgence, on their own they could do nothing. So, Britain and France put pressure on the Czechs all summer to appease the Sudeten Germans and in the first week of September Edvard Benes, the Czech President finally folded and in a meeting with Henlein promised to meet all the demands set out in the Karlsbad Programme.
However, Hitler never wanted autonomy for the Sudetenland, he wanted it incorporated into the Reich, and it led him to demand that Henlein arrange for more “incidents” while he finalised his military plans. In Hitler’s closing speech at the Nuremburg Rally on September 12th, he laid into President Benes on a personal level and accused the Czechs of oppressing the Sudeten Germans, though he was careful not to make any precise demands. It was taken as a signal for a rising in the Sudetenland and a number of people were killed. The Czechs were not to be intimidated though and martial law was declared and the uprising put down.
Following a visit to London, the French Prime Minister, Edouard Daladier and their Foreign Minister, Bonnet, decided that such a serious situation required Chamberlain to meet personally with Hitler and he flew to meet with him on September 15th at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden where Hitler had his mountain retreat. Chamberlain thought Hitler was about to attack Czechoslovakia whereas he in fact needed a little more time. Still, Hitler told Chamberlain that he was ready to risk a world war but that it could be averted if self-determination was granted immediately. Chamberlain agreed, for those areas with a 50%+ German population, but needed Cabinet approval as well as getting the French on board and pressuring the Czechs into accepting, before any formal agreement could be reached.
The French readily agreed but when the plan was presented to the Czechs they at first refused to accept it. However seeing the hopelessness of their position,
they gave in. ‘We had no other choice, because we were left alone’, was how a government communique put it. ‘We have been basely betrayed’, was how President Benes privately put it.[3]
But by the time Chamberlain returned to Germany to meet with Hitler again, this time at Godesberg on the Rhine, Hitler had already decided that not even a rump Czechoslovakia would be allowed to exist. And he was finalising plans for the first phase, the invasion of the Sudetenland, as negotiations with Chamberlain were underway. This even though Hitler had promised Chamberlain that he would not take any military action until they met again. What is more, he was also continuing to apply pressure to the Hungarians and even the Slavs to grab what they could.
Chamberlain went to Godesberg with his plan on September 22nd. A commission would sort out the details of the hand-over (property rights, what to do with refugees, and the like). However, Hitler responded that, given the further unrest in the region, nothing less than an immediate occupation by German troops would suffice. He also wanted additional areas though accepted these would require a plebiscite, but there would be no compensation to Czech property owners, and he added that Hungarian and Polish demands must also be satisfied. He wanted to demonstrate, and for all the world to see, the spinelessness of the British and French.
Discussions between Hitler and Chamberlain became heated and things were not helped when Hitler demanded that the Czech’s evacuation of the region begin on September 26th and that it be completed by September 28th; Chamberlain called it nothing other than a Diktat. Things then became more heated when the leaders were informed of Czechoslovakia’s general mobilisation. Hitler claimed the Czechs had mobilised first, Chamberlain accused Germany of having already mobilised. All seemed lost. Still, Chamberlain left on amicable terms having seemingly wrung a minor concession out of Hitler (in fact no concession at all) to delay occupation until October 1st with a deadline of September 28th for Czech acquiescence, and a promise of no further territorial claims.
On his return Chamberlain couldn’t get agreement from the Czechs or the French and he was obliged to inform Hitler that, if France went to war with Germany as a result of honouring its treaty with the Czechs, then Britain would be obliged to support France. Hitler’s private response was vitriolic, in public, in a speech in Berlin on September 26th, he declared ‘My patience is at an end … The decision now lies in Herr Benes’ hands: Peace or War. He will either accept this offer and give us the Germans, or we will go and fetch this freedom for ourselves.’[4]
It continued to appear as if Hitler had taken a step too far: the Czechs were standing firm, the French partial mobilisation looked like a full one, and Britain had informed Hitler that it would, in turn, stand by France. Indeed Britain had mobilised its fleet, called up its Auxiliary Air Force and declared a state of emergency. The Soviet Union also informed the French of the steps they were taking. Meanwhile Italy was doing nothing to tie down French troops on the Franco-Italian border, and President Roosevelt made clear that if war resulted, then Germany would be to blame.
On September 27th, with less than twenty-four hours before the German deadline for a Czech response, Hitler, worried by the lack of enthusiasm for war in Germany and worried too by the efficiency of the French mobilization (though he still thought they wouldn’t fight), wrote to Chamberlain opening the door again to last-ditch negotiations. Chamberlain meanwhile also sent two messages: to Eduard Benes, the Czech President. The first made clear that nothing could be done to prevent the Germans overrunning the Czechs. The second, (which was supported by the French) urged the Czechs to accept a limited German military occupation in the first instance but also warned that, even if war resulted, the Sudetenland would still be lost to Czechoslovakia; so why risk a European war?
But it was an appeal to Mussolini from both Chamberlain and President Roosevelt that broke the immediate deadlock. Mussolini urged Hitler to accept the last-minute British compromise, a partial military occupation in the first instance. The French now suggested a larger part of the Sudetenland be immediately occupied. With barely hours until the German ultimatum ran out, the French, British and Italian ambassadors were virtually queuing up to make last-ditch appeals to Hitler; but it was the appeal delivered by the Italian ambassador from Mussolini that averted war. A summit meeting between Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier and Mussolini was hastily arranged; they were to meet in Munich straight away, on September 30th. No representative from Czechoslovakia or from Russia was invited.
[1] Quoted in Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives, p. 622, Ruth Henig, The Origins of the Second World War, p. 33 + William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p.359
[2] Quoted in Alan Bullock, p. 622 + William L. Shirer, p.362
[3] Quotes from William L. Shirer, p. 391
[4] Quoted in Alan Bullock, p. 638