Hitler’s second great mistake of 1941

By the end of 1941, Hitler faced a very different war than that which he had planned for. For not only was he facing determined Soviet resistance, on December 7^th, the day following the Soviet Union’s devastating counter-attack in defence of Moscow, Japan attacked Pearl Harbour, America’s Pacific naval base in Hawaii. Although Hitler had been wary of America’s economic and military power and had been careful to avoid open confrontation with them, Hitler’s relationship with America was more than strained, it was almost an undeclared state of war.

America, the ‘arsenal of democracy’, had been giving increasing material support to Britain: the transfer of fifty American destroyers in 1940, and the Lend-Lease Act of March 11^th, 1941, which authorized the lending or leasing of equipment to any nation ‘whose defence the President deems vital to the defence of the United States’ was immediately given to Britain and quickly extended to the Chinese Nationalists in April and to the Soviet Union following Germany’s invasion. Lend-Lease with respect to Britain had been controversial and Congress had added the proviso that American ships should not be used to escort the goods lest they get dragged into the conflict. Adding the Soviet Union to the recipients of American aid was even more so. Roosevelt himself had described the Soviet Union as ‘a dictatorship as absolute as any other dictatorship in the world.’^[1] But he also thought that defeating Germany was of upmost importance and that required the Soviet Union to stay in the war. He also felt that America needed to play a part, even if only a financial-material part, if it was to have a say in the postwar world. So, Lend-Lease was extended to the Soviet Union on October 1^st, 1941, granting the Soviet Union interest-free credits to pay for the goods America would provide.

America had also repealed the American Neutrality Act in November, 1940 and the situation between German U-boats and American shipping is what had led to a virtual state of war, if undeclared. America had occupied Iceland in July, 1941 in order to protect its shipping on the North Atlantic route which served only to supply Britain, and President Roosevelt had ordered commanders to ‘shoot on sight’, if they thought American shipping might be threatened. But this was very different to an “actual” state of war which would most likely lead to American troops, American planes involved in the fight against Germany.

It was also known that in November America’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (the US Joint Board) had decided that, should America find itself at war with both Japan and Germany, then it would fight a defensive war in the Pacific, giving priority to achieving victory in Europe first. But preparations for the Pacific War would be made and thirteen new aircraft carriers were commissioned as well as more submarines.

Yet Hitler still decided, when he didn’t have to, and when he was struggling to contain Zhukov’s counter-offensive deep in Soviet territory, to declare war on America, just four days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. But the Japanese attack boosted his confidence at a time when the reversal in the Soviet Union left him needing it. Though he would have preferred the Japanese to attack the Soviet Union, by attacking America they would hopefully divert American and British attention from Europe. And by enlarging the scale of the war, making it an inter-continental conflict, Hitler was seizing back the initiative. He felt back in control.

But the euphoria that he felt only led him to misjudge badly just what he was taking on. He lost sight of the economic and military power he was pitting Germany against, and so a second misjudgment: he didn’t expect America to be ready to engage in Europe in any meaningful way until the end of 1942, leaving him free to complete his defeat of the Soviet Union (against a resurgent enemy and without his experienced commanders who he had dismissed). So, when he explained his decision to the Reichstag on December 11^th, he was in a bullish mood. He labelled Roosevelt a ‘so-called President’, ‘mad’, wrapping ‘himself in a cloak of Christian hypocrisy’ while being guilty of a series of the worst crimes against international law.’ He went on to exonerate Germany and Italy: ‘In this way’, he went on, ‘the sincere efforts of Germany and Italy to prevent an extension of the war and to maintain relations with the United States in spite of the unbearable provocations which have been carried on for years by President Roosevelt have been frustrated …’^[2] And he told them, ‘I can only be grateful to Providence that it entrusted me with the leadership in this historic struggle which, for the next 500 or 1,000 years, will be described as decisive, not only for the history of Germany but for the whole of Europe and indeed for the whole of the world…’^[3]

So, a blameless Hitler (yet again) and a confident Hitler. But a Hitler who had now made two huge mistakes. Mistakes that would ultimately bring about Nazi Germany’s defeat.

[1] Quoted in Robert Gellately, p. 485

[2] Quoted in William L. Shirer, p. 898

[3] Quoted in Alan Bullock, p. 838