Hitler’s War: Opportunity and Diplomacy
In this second part of our look at “Hitler’s War” I will examine Hitler’s ability to seize on opportunities and link it to diplomacy, something that is often overlooked, and I will also return to where we began: with Hitler’s words, though this time words that set out to deceive. My focus will be the first big gamble Hitler took in 1936 when he remilitarised the Rhineland.
Hitler’s plan for remilitarisation of the Rhineland was initiated a year before he made his move, which was less than two weeks after, in a speech on May 21st to the Reichstag, he had declared war to be senseless – ‘The blood shed on the European continent in the course of the last three hundred years bears no proportion to the national result of the events.’ – and in which he promised to ‘uphold and fulfill all obligations arising out of the Locarno Treaty.’[1] But through the winter of 1935-6 he was forced to show restraint and bide his time.
Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia gave him the opportunity as the League and, in particular, Britain and France were distracted. Whilst the weak response from Britain and France to Mussolini’s invasion gave him encouragement. But it was the mutual-assistance treaty between France and the Soviet Union, finally ratified by the French in February, 1936 (it had been drawn up almost a year earlier), that gave him the excuse, the ‘element of legal insecurity’ (this is how Hitler had described the treaty).
March 7th, the day in which German troops moved into the Rhineland, was a Saturday. Hitler had astutely set the day as it would make it harder for the French and British governments to co-ordinate a response, though in fact Britain was sympathetic to Germany’s right to defend its own border whilst France was unsure of its ability to act. But being a Saturday didn’t stop Hitler from delivering a speech to the Reichstag (which was conveniently meeting), declaring, ‘Germany no longer feels bound by the Locarno Treaty.’[2]
What also contributed to the muted response from the British and the French, however, was an element of diplomacy, totally without sincerity, but diplomacy nevertheless. For, in a note delivered by his Foreign Secretary, Baron von Neurath, to the ambassadors of Britain, France and Italy, as well as in his speech to the Reichstag on March 7th, Hitler presented a set of new proposals to ensure peace. To replace the Locarno Treaty (which remilitarisation of the Rhineland had destroyed) he offered twenty-five-year non-aggression pacts with both Belgium and France, to be guaranteed by Britain and Italy (and Holland if it wished to be involved). And having just remilitarised it, he suggested the demilitarisation of both sides of the Franco-German border. This last point serves to illustrate just how insincere, in fact, his proposals were as to demilitarise the border on both sides would require France to dismantle the Maginot Line, leaving it defenceless should Germany decide instead to attack it. He also offered an air pact and he offered non-aggression pacts with Germany’s neighbours to the east on similar lines to the pact concluded with Poland in January, 1934. And he said that Germany would return to the League of Nations though its covenant would need to be reformed.
The effect of what Hitler had achieved was so significant that it can hardly be exaggerated. When Hitler announced to the Reichstag that the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance had invalidated the Locarno Treaty and that German forces had entered the Rhineland, the assembly leapt to its feet, cheering and with hands raised in salute. Hitler’s popularity reached new heights though what was of even greater significance is that Hitler now stood above his generals who had weakened (they had wanted it called off) as he stood firm, whereas if he had failed, and they had been proven right, he might have faced a military coup.
What is more, Britain and France, but particularly France, had lost the best opportunity to stand firm themselves without risking a major conflict. As it was, Germany’s position was greatly strengthened, whilst that of France was greatly weakened. France had lost a vital buffer zone, leaving the Maginot Line her only defence should Germany threaten again. It led to a defensive mentality in French military thinking: defend the Maginot Line and everything will be alright. But Germany had attacked through Belgium in 1914 and in 1940 would do so again, through the Ardennes. Meanwhile the wider strategic position had changed even more dramatically.
France’s allies, Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union all realised that France, who backed away when its own security was threatened, was not going to stand up in support of their security. And they knew that the balance of the strategic map of Europe would be changed even more detrimentally (to them) once Germany had completed the construction of its own defences, the West Wall. France was no longer in a position to come to their aid through a defenceless Rhineland giving Hitler a much stronger hand to play when he turned his attention to eastern Europe. Such was the significance of Hitler’s bold move.
And all this Hitler had achieved by seizing the opportunity, deceptive diplomacy and by false words.
[1] Quoted in William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 285-6
[2] Quoted in William L. Shirer, p. 291