Franz Joseph and the July Crisis

Margaret MacMillan writes that ‘… a handful of men in each of Europe’s main capitals juggled with fateful decisions. Products of their backgrounds and times, with deeply engrained beliefs in prestige and honour (and such terms were going to be used frequently in those hectic days), they based their decisions on assumptions that they did not always articulate, even to themselves. They also were at the mercy of their own memories of past triumphs and defeats, and of their hopes and fears for the future.’^[1]

Franz Joseph was, of all the monarchs, the most able, though still very much of the ancien regime. He had endured tremendous personal tragedy in his life but remained duty-bound, living an incredibly simple life for an emperor, and working tirelessly to hold his empire together. It is worth noting that he had little love for his nephew and heir to his throne, Franz Ferdinand, and didn’t particularly grieve for his loss (the Archduke just didn’t seem to be a likeable person). It is also worth noting that, at the time of the July crisis in 1914, Franz Joseph was 84 and his health was beginning to fail and he was increasingly reluctant to intervene in government matters. He didn’t attend a single meeting of the Council of Ministers in the three years prior to the war, creating a vacuum in leadership that tempted others to try to fill.

So what were the opinions of his advisors who had been kept busy directing Austro-Hungarian policy? Austria-Hungary’s chief of the general staff, Count Conrad von Hotzendorf, was fearful of the outcome of war yet still unequivocal in his message to his staff: ‘War. War. War.’ Conrad was one of those who believed that the history of nations was a history of struggle as nations rose and fell. He saw Italy as an enemy and advocated going to war with it whilst Russia was weakened by the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and again in 1911 when Italy went to war with the Ottoman Empire over Libya. He saw Serbia as an enemy as well and called for a preventive was against it too. Count Alexander Hoyos, who would act as Berchtold’s emissary in Berlin, favoured a firm response too, though also suggested that it was likely to a desperate affair. ‘We are still capable of resolve! We do not want to or ought to be a sick man. Better to be destroyed quickly.’^[2] Whilst Count Leopold Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, who had previously advised caution, now felt that a firm response was required, and critically, Franz Joseph was of the same opinion, though he would breathe easier if he had German support. The only voice of caution came from the Hungarian Prime Minister, Istvan Tisza, who felt that there was insufficient evidence of Serbian involvement and was also worried that Austria-Hungary would be isolated in a Balkan war.

Ultimately though, it was Franz Joseph’s decision to go to war and Jack Beatty makes a point of the number of times the personal pronoun “I” was used in Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war on Serbia – twenty-six times – as well as “my House”, “my monarchy”, “my peoples” and “my army”.^[3]

[1] Margaret MacMillan, pp. 512-3

[2] Quoted in Margaret MacMillan, p. 520

[3] Jack Beatty, p. 179