A line in the sand: the Sykes-Picot Agreement
In this series I’m going to go back to the Middle East and the roots of the Middle East as we know it today; with all its problems. And to do that, I have to go back to WW1, even before the war, at least a little bit.
Britain and France (and Russia) were allies in the war against the Central Powers – Germany and Austria-Hungary – and their allies which included the Ottoman Empire. But Britain had been a most reluctant ally of France. It had an entente with France and agreements with Russia but they were not alliances and they were not firm allies before war broke out. In fact, Britain was very, very reluctant to get involved and only finally decided to go to war when Germany invaded Belgium.
True, the Entente had survived German pressure before the Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination but at the end of the nineteenth century, in the last days of the scramble for Africa, Briain and France had also almost gone to war over a place you would never have heard of if you haven’t studied the events leading up to WW1: Fashoda in the Upper Nile. Hardly surprisingly, then, the alliance also had many tense phases during the war with disagreements over strategy and accusations made by both countries as to the reasoning behind the decisions being made.
Still, the war-time alliance had held firm in the face of the most brutal, costly war the world had ever known. But the ancient rivalries between the two countries had never been forgotten and there were those who thought that the alliance was not likely to last long once the war was over. In fact, Britain had closer pre-war ties with Germany which had been Britain’s largest European trading partner before the war (second-largest in the world). And the Paris Peace Conference soon brought about a strain on Anglo-French relationships, indeed Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau frequently argued furiously, completely losing their tempers. A witness claimed that in one argument, Clemenceau offered Lloyd George a choice of pistols or swords, and this over the topic I’m about to explore: the Middle East. But this rivalry and mistrust went much further down the lines of power than the two leaders. Basically, the British didn’t trust the French and the French didn’t trust the British.
Now, the Ottoman Empire had been regarded for some time before war broke out as ‘the sick man of Europe’. It was in trouble: it went bankrupt in 1876, and while British investors recovered what they could the French bought up most of its debt; still, it had lost its European empire before the outbreak of WW1, Libya too, though it had held onto its eastern empire: Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Iraq (then known as Mesopotamia) and it was clinging onto control of the coastal fringes of the Arabian Peninsula (what would become Saudi Arabia), while its sultan was still recognised as caliph, successor to the Prophet Muhammad, and so, guardian, of the three holy sites of the Muslim world: Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem.
Meanwhile, Britain already had a considerable presence in the Middle East. It had bought Egypt’s shares in the Suez Canal’s operating company when Egypt faced financial crisis in 1875 and in 1882 it invaded and occupied Egypt (then technically part of the Ottoman Empire) in order to protect its various interests, the canal included. It seems crazy but Egypt remained, formally at least, a part of the Ottoman Empire, but it became a de facto British protectorate until 1914, and a formal protectorate only after the Ottoman’s entered WW1 on the side of the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary). This lasted until Britain declared Egypt an independent state in 1922 though even then, Britain retained a military presence in order to protect the Suez Canal. So, Britain was already flexing its imperial muscles in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire before WW1.
But let’s go back to the tail end of 1915, with Europe burdened with war, a war that had already cost a great deal in life and money, a young MP, Sir Mark Sykes, was called to Downing Street to meet with the war council. He was regarded as an expert on the Middle East, though he wasn’t, and it was thought that he could speak both Turkish and Arabic, though he couldn’t. No matter, prime minister Asquith and his war council (Lord Kitchener, Lloyd George and Arthur Balfour) were, on the whole, left impressed with what he had to say.
Sykes proposed to the war council that a line be drawn from Acre, in the north of today’s Israel, to Kirkuk, in today’s Iraq. Britain would take everything Ottoman to the south of the line, France everything north of it (Turkey excluded, or at least most of it). Now, this might be fine but Asquith remembered how close Britain and France had come to war over Fashoda and didn’t want to provoke the French in the same manner as they had provoked the British twenty years earlier.
Meanwhile, when Turkey formally entered the war in October, 1914, in support of Germany, and actually the sultan hadn’t wanted to, he nevertheless declared a holy war, a jihad. And as caliph, he had 100 million Muslims under his control. So, with Britain enemy No 1 and with Muslims making up a quarter of India’s population, not to mention most of Egypt’s, and indeed there were large Muslim populations across its empire, it was a big deal for Britain. And to complete the dangerous cocktail, let me add that oil was already a factor. And we have to be clear that, back in 1916, oil was wanted for the navy more than anything else. It was clear that it would be the future for naval ships, for all ships.
After the Gallipoli landings had failed (more of which in the next episode), the British responded by securing an agreement with Sharif Husein, sharif and Emir of Mecca. As sharif, he was recognised as a direct descendent of the Prophet Muhammad which out-trumped the sultan, and he was eager to lead a revolt against the Turks, which he would do in 1916. And if successful (and Britain would help), it would mean he would replace the sultan as caliph, though he would be dependent on British support, and so, would be likely to succumb to British influence (or so the British hoped).
The immediate problem was that Husein wanted his empire to include not just the Arabian Peninsula, but Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. The very territory over which Britain and France were in the process of sharing between themselves. And Britain feared that if they didn’t respond positively, Husein would throw in his lot with the Germans and the Turks which would also mean the sultan’s jihad. A huge problem for Britain, as they needed the Entente to hold together in the fight against Germany, while at the same time wanting to head off a jihad which could cause serious problems for the British, not least in Egypt, as that meant the Suez Canal could be taken from them. To try and dig their way out of the hole they were in, they dug a bigger hole: they deliberately misled the sharif with vague language and the French with half-truths. They even misled each other; cabinet ministers were either left in the dark or else misled. And the French did something similar. In other words, typical diplomacy.
Enter Francois Georges-Picot onto the scene, a committed French imperialist, a French diplomat and a member of the Comité de l’Asie Francaise, a small group but nevertheless a powerful group of French imperialists. It was literally in his blood, both his father and his brother had been fervent imperialists, his father was a founder-member of the comité, and all three had been left feeling frustrated by different French governments. Georges-Picot had joined the French diplomatic corps the same year as Fashoda (which incidentally was the result of pressure applied on the French government by the Comité de l’Asie Francaise), which naturally dominated French foreign policy in the years that followed the incident. He was aware of Arab nationalist ambitions and as WW1 began, he did what he could to help them, only to blunder leading to many nationalists being killed when the Ottomans learnt what he had been up to. And he was clear about what he wanted: French control of Syria and Palestine stretching south to Egypt’s border and east to Mosul.
And when the British finally came clean with the French, at a meeting with Georges-Picot, his response was that Syria had to be French. France had been protecting Christians in Syria since the Crusades and had a considerable presence there. Besides, no one in France would accept giving it away after the sacrifices on the Western Front, not with the Ottomans siding with Germany, and in any case, he argued that an enlarged Arab state under Husein simply wouldn’t work as the different tribes wouldn’t allow it to. But although there were fierce imperialists on both sides pushing their governments to assert their claims, with war raging, both governments were keen to ensure their alliance held. The British accepted that Georges-Picot had a point and that the optics – British imperialist manoeuvrings whilst France is fighting for its life and suffering horrific casualties – didn’t look good but still, they were in a bit of a fix. Then, the French panicked. Were they taking on more territory than they could manage? And so, Georges-Picot was instructed to take Palestine out of the discussions (though he didn’t), while at the same time the British brought Lebanon into the discussions: they wanted it to be in the package for Sharif Husein.
But it was an incredibly complex situation. Indeed, it was to become more complex. The alliance between France and Britain needed to remain firm lest the war in Europe be lost. Consequently, both sides would like to see a blow dealt the Turks. Yet at the same time, they both looked towards the post-war world and, in the Middle East, sought to out-manoeuvre each other, as well as the Arabs, so as to reap the spoils that they felt were there to be had. And as we’ve noted, there were those, in both the British camp and the French camp who saw the Entente Cordiale between the two nations as nothing more than a temporary convenience, unlikely to outlast the war when the two countries’ ancient rivalry would be resumed.
And this is the point that was reached when Sykes and Georges-Picot met for the first time. However, they were actually quickly able to reach an agreement. Sykes did not think that Arab nationalism would be a problem for the British and Georges-Picot was happy to leave him thinking that way. Palestine was a sticking point for Georges-Picot, he knew what it meant for French imperialists, but they were able to get around the problem by agreeing to put it under international control. Both knew that such an agreement had the potential for future problems. But not as much as the decision to divide the region that had been promised to Sharif Husein between themselves. Nevertheless, after getting the approval of their ally Russia, the two governments sealed the agreement with an exchange of letters. As with the original proposal put by Sykes to the war cabinet, north of the “line in the sand” (from Acre to Kirkuk), would fall under France’s influence, and the south under British influence, with the status of Palestine the only change. The Arabian Peninsula didn’t interest either Britain or France – it was nothing but sand; so they thought. Britain agreed that Russia would be free to annex Constantinople (today’s Istanbul) and the Straits (the stretches of water that linked the Black Sea with the Mediterranean), a huge concession by Britain which goes a long way to demonstrating what Britain thought it was gaining, and Russia would also take Turkish territory next to its border with Russia. This was in May 1916. But it was kept secret. And Russia would lose what it had been promised when the Bolsheviks seized power.
France was delighted with the deal. The British government was happy as they had neatly placed the French between their share of the spoils and Russia. But there were some in Britain unhappy with the status of Palestine. They thought that with Palestine so close to the Suez Canal, Britain would be better controlling it, if not a large military force would have to be kept in Egypt at considerable cost. Such was the distrust of a country they were allied to, in a war in which defeat couldn’t be contemplated. Also, if they were to control the oil fields of Mesopotamia and Persia (Iraq and Iran respectively), Palestine would be the best place to run a pipeline through to Haifa on the Mediterranean coast. And indeed, by 1940 oil was running through such a pipeline.
So, Britain set about trying to do something about it. Their answer was to garner support for Zionism: the creation of a Jewish state. And they had a political ally in the cabinet. Herbert Samuel was both Jewish and a Zionist, and in 1916 he was Home Secretary. He argued that as well as creating goodwill towards Britain from Jews across Europe, it would win the support of American Jews too, and that could help bring America into the war – we are now in the summer of 1916 and the tragic failure of the Somme offensive, and by the end of the year, America would have a new president: President Wilson. Long term, by supporting a Jewish state, Britain would guarantee a friendly state immediately east of Suez. And his argument won the support of Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary. Of course, the Americans knew nothing of the Sykes-Picot agreement.
When Asquith, along with Grey, resigned at the end of 1916, Lloyd George became prime minister and Lloyd George, ever the pragmatist, critics would say cynical pragmatist, saw the same advantages (the Zionist cause would mask Britain’s imperial ambitions while at the same time, providing some protection for the Suez Canal). He also felt that Jewish support was more likely to be helpful in winning the war than Arab support. When the idea was mooted to the French, they thought it hardly credible: Britain would surely not risk a policy that was bound to cause trouble between Jew and Arab.
And so, with British manoeuvrings having already dug a hole that was going to be difficult to climb out of, I’ll pause this sorry tale for this week.
British and French Manoeuvrings During WW1
Now, I had said in the last episode that the British-French alliance had held firm under the strains, and there were, as we should have no trouble understanding, considerable strains during what was an existential war.
And one of these strains was over opening a front against the Turks in 1915 in order to weaken the enemy’s alliance and threaten Austria-Hungary from the south. Britain had wanted to attack the Turks simultaneously at Alexandretta (today’s Iskenderun in south-eastern Turkey) and Gallipoli. And if the attack at Alexandretta had been successful, it would have taken the heart of the Turks railway network cutting the Ottoman Empire in two. But the French said it didn’t have the resources and France did have the German army fighting on French soil and so its resources were indeed stretched. But at the same time, politically, France did not want the British operating in their sphere of influence. Instead, the British were forced to make their attack at Gallipoli which was a disaster on a scale not far off the Somme and Passchendaele for the British and Empire forces – something held against the French, as Fashoda still was, by a good number of those working in the British Foreign Office and the intelligence service. And indeed, in France, the attack sparked concerns for if it had been successful, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, just to the east of Alexandretta, would have come into play as British forces would have needed to secure the region lest Turkish forces attack them from the rear as they pushed north. As a consequence, the Comité de l’Asie Francaise pressured the French government to make Syria and Palestine a French war aim, because they were ‘the land of the Crusades’.
But before we move on, let’s be clear on the themes so far in this history?
Allies (that is Britain and France) that didn’t trust each other; indeed, allies that shouldn’t trust each other
How British and French imperialism was paying little regard to the needs of those who had lived for generation after generation in the Middle East
And the hole Britain was digging itself saying different things to the French, the Arabs and the Zionists
So, back to the Middle East, at the point we left things in the last episode, at the end of 1916, the hole Britain had dug, the hole that had got bigger, was made bigger again; was made enormously bigger. First, with the Americans having now entered the war (in April), the British made them aware of the Sykes-Picot agreement. They were furious. Edward House, President Wilson’s top adviser, could see that the British and French were “making a breeding place for future war”. And he was right. It was a naked act of imperialism, much as the British and French tried to sell it as an act motivated by the desire to free the Arab populations currently under Turkish rule, and it would be the breeding ground for a future war. Yet, in truth, it was an agreement in abstract, neither Britain nor France controlled the territory they had designs on. War still raged, in Europe as well as in the Middle East, and which way that war would go, i.e. who would win was by no means certain.
But there was another Brit in the Middle East, someone who was going to reach mythical proportions: one T. E. Lawrence. He had gone to the Middle East as a Cambridge undergraduate, tramping around studying the castles of the Crusades, learning the culture and a smattering of the language as he went along. If there was a European expert on Arab culture it was Lawrence. In October, 1916 he was sent to discover why Husein’s revolt against the Turks, which boke out in the middle of the year, was in trouble: it had captured Mecca but had then quickly ground to a halt. He was happy to help the Arabs, he was even more happy to thwart French ambitions, particularly when it came to getting their hands on Syria. In this way the legend that was Lawrence of Arabia really began for Lawrence worked with the Arabs to thwart not only the French but British plans too: he wanted to make sure the Sykes-Picot agreement never came into effect.
And he worked not with Husein, who he thought would only block what he had in mind – take Damascus and so Syria with Arab forces so as to scupper the Sykes-Picot agreement, but with one of his sons, Feisal, who had some links with the embryonic Arab nationalist movement in Syria and Iraq, and because Lawrence thought he could bend to his will. He was playing a dangerous and a high-risk game. At times he actually worked against Britain’s war plans in the region in order to get to Damascus. He hoped that if he could put Damascus in Arab hands, and then reveal the Skyes-Picot Agreement to the world, it would be exposed for what it was: another imperial plot, and in an increasingly anti-imperialist world, it would be scuppered.
But the French were alert to the danger Husein’s revolt presented. They were concerned that if the revolt succeeded without their involvement, it might spark revolts against French rule in Arab (and so, Muslim) north Africa, though they were also concerned to show the Arabs that their support would be more valuable to them than anything the British could offer. And so, the French offered Husein assistance. So, we have the French helping Husein in order to bolster their presence in Syria and Lawrence working with Husein’s son, Feisal in order to block French ambitions.
And as for revealing the Skyes-Picot Agreement, Lawrence was beaten to it in 1917 by the Bolsheviks who having had Russia’s claims in the Ottoman Empire denied published a copy of the Sykes–Picot Agreement in both Izvestia and Pravda. This was on November 23rd. On November 26th The Manchester Guardian printed the texts. Lenin called the treaty “the agreement of the colonial thieves.” The hole was now enormous.
It had actually been made bigger still because on November 7th 1917, a letter from Arthur Balfour, the British foreign secretary, to Lionel Walter Rothschild, a leader of the British Jewish community, was published in The Times newspaper which made clear Britain’s support for, and its determination to bring about, “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”. This became known as the Balfour Declaration. It also promised that “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine,” but how it proposed to square that circle was anybody’s guess and it was, of course, contradictory to both the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the agreement with Sharif Husein.
By then things had changed on the ground too, as Lawrence joined forces with General Allenby who had taken over command of Britain’s Egyptian Expeditionary Force in June 1917. He had been instructed by Lloyd George to “take Jerusalem by Christmas”. And this he did, just before Christmas actually, helped by Lawrence and Feisal (and with Georges-Picot in tow), and entering the city on foot as a mark of respect. And incidentally, given what’s going on today, not before taking Gaza first. Lloyd George called it “a Christmas present for the British people”. The French saw it differently. They were horrified, apart from anything else, it meant protestants and not Catholics had taken the Holy city. And they were even less happy when the British refused to hand over a share of the administration of Jerusalem or even any parts of Syria it had captured, even though they had been earmarked for the French. The British claimed they were a military zone and so they would remain in control.
Now, not long after becoming president at the end of 1916, President Wilson had made clear his anti-imperialism: “No nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people”, he said, repeating the message in the new year that “every people should be left free to determine its own policy … the little along with the great and the powerful.” And on January 8th 1918, President Wilson made his famous speech on War Aims and Peace Terms that set out his 14 Points for building a new post-war order, the first of which referred to the need for open diplomacy: “peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.” The fifth point concerned colonial matters and the need for people to have a say in their own future: “A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.” This is the principle of self-determination which is a key factor in other points, including the twelfth point that deals specifically with Turkey and the Ottoman Empire: “The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.” In other words, everything the Sykes-Picot Agreement had tried to deny, and the British and French were still playing the same game.
Publicly, Lloyd George seemed to agree with Wilson’s sentiments. But British policy was to ensure the “facts on the ground” left Britain in a strong position when the negotiations were renewed. Lord Cecil, a Foreign Office minister, didn’t mince his words: “We must never forget that, internationally, the French are a grasping people and we shall have a much better chance of getting reasonable terms out of them if they come to us in the first instance to get something they want.” That, of course, would be Syria. And on the ground, on October 1st 1918 the British army, again with Lawrence in tow, entered Damascus. I have to add that Lawrence actually drove into Damascus in a commandeered Rolls Royce. The man had style. But of high significance, given the issue of Syria, before the British entered the city, they held back in order to let the Arabs enter first, and Allenby made Feisal head of the local administration. But the French pushed hard to make the world aware that Damascus was actually taken by the British not the Arabs, even making Lawrence (much as they hated him) the hero in the process. Such was their desperation.
And the British government was exposed at the bottom of that enormous hole it had dug for itself. It reluctantly accepted that France would have responsibility for Syria, but it wouldn’t include Mosul. Allenby was left with the awkward job of telling Feisal (Feisal had immediately set about trying to impose an Arab administration). But he did so with half-truths, half truths that still left Feisal feeling betrayed, but he was at least left in control of Damascus and the territory to its east but France would be the “protecting power” when the war was over. So, now the Arabs were aware that they had been betrayed by the British, double-crossed, both in Palestine by the Balfour Declaration and now in Syria.
Lawrence had had enough, the British had no intention of honouring the agreement they had made with Sharif Husein, and he left the war and returned to Britain to fight for the Arab’s cause. He didn’t get the British government to accept his case for more Arab self-rule but he did bring about a stronger anti-French sentiment. The words, the speeches and the promises, coming from both the British and French governments were now nothing more than smoke and mirrors, designed to mislead not only the Arabs but America too, and, in fact, each other. Lawrence, to his credit, refused a knighthood and promotion to brigadier-general. Instead, with the war over, Lawrence accompanied Feisal to the Paris Peace Conference to argue for the Arab cause, dressed in Arab headdress and robes.
The Peace Conference
This episode begins a considered look at the manoeuvrings both immediately before and during the Paris Peace Conference, the conference that shaped the world after WW1. Its really important to do so in a little detail because this conference really did set in motion the grievances that the Arab world and the Muslim world hold against the West today, and that includes, not only the fact that there is an Israeli state, and the situation in Gaza and the West Bank today, but it also goes a long way to explaining the sorry state of Lebanon too, and also any proper explanation of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the regime of Saddam Hussein and the tragic civil war in Syria. So, we’re looking at something very significant here.
Just four days before the armistice agreement that ended WW I and so, before anyone travelled to Paris for the peace conference, in an attempt to appease the Americans and in particular, President Wilson’s demands for self-determination, the Anglo-French Declaration in November, 1918, called for the “complete and final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.” Now hang onto those words as this little tale unfolds; because it was nothing more than a smokescreen, and the Arab celebrations that followed the declaration, were sadly misplaced.
Neither Britain nor France had any intention of handing over power to national governments. Governments might be elected, but if the two imperial powers had anything to do with it, they would be in control. The declaration also said that the British and French governments would “ensure by their support and adequate assistance” that the peoples of the Middle East would be well governed – another way of saying they would be governed in a way that best suited the British or the French. It also meant that when they got together with Wilson in Paris, self-determination would be used to ensure British and French dominance in the region. As Lord Curzon said (and he would be made Britain’s Foreign Secretary a few months after the Treaty of Versailles had been signed): “We ought to play self-determination for all its worth, knowing in the bottom of our hearts we are more likely to benefit from it than anybody else.” Now that’s more like it, though that was said in private.
Also, before the Paris conference first met, the British brought Feisal and the leading British Zionist, Chaim Weizmann, together and got them to agree to defer the setting of a border between Feisal’s would-be kingdom and Palestine until after the conference, thereby ridding Britain of a potential problem at the conference. This pact between the two men, signed at the beginning of January 1919, barely two weeks before the conference in Paris began, is sometimes used to legitimise the state of Israel as it was freely agreed by Feisal. However, Palestine was not to be exclusively for Jews, Feisal had been promised Arab independence (which they didn’t get). In a memorandum for the peace conference that Lawrence helped him write, he set out his hopes: full independence for Syria, outside support in Mesopotamia (which would be necessary in order to exploit its oil) and a trusteeship in Palestine which he accepted as necessary in order to ensure peace between the different races and their religions. In both cases, it was clear to all that he had Britain in mind. And I should point out that Feisal was being subsidised by the British to the tune of 150,000 pounds a month
Meanwhile, in order to ensure Britain and France got what they wanted, and knowing that President Wilson would try to block his moves, Lloyd George and Clemenceau met in London in December, 1918. And, determined as he was, that Britain should get both Palestine and Mosul, Lloyd George, plied pressure on the French before the meeting, hinting that the return of Alsace-Lorraine was not a given (if there was to be a plebiscite, the vote might not go France’s way), and France might need British support. Lloyd George didn’t have it all his own way in the meeting, though. He had wanted Feisal at the meeting but Clemenceau, who understandably saw Feisal as in the pocket of the British, would have none of that. So, on that, Lloyd George gave way: “the friendship of France is worth ten Syrias,” he assured Clemenceau. Clemenceau himself wasn’t much interested in the Middle East. But he was very interested about Alsace-Lorraine and French security vis-à-vis Germany. “What do you want?”, Clemenceau asked Lloyd George when they met. “I want Mosul”, came the reply. “You shall have it”, Clemenceau said, “Anything else?” “Yes, I want Jerusalem.” “You shall have it”, came Clemenceau’s reply. But France would expect to get Syria and Clemenceau would have cause to regret how easily he gave the British what they wanted.
Apart from dealing with the Turks as they thought they deserved, and on a personal level, Lloyd George hated them – as far as he was concerned, they had turned “the cradle of civilization into a blighted desert”, the British had three things they wanted. First, access in the Straits that pass-through Constantinople. Britain, though it had given way with the war in the balance and the Sykes-Picot agreement to conclude, had long wanted to make sure Russian ships didn’t have free access to them. A communist Russia would be no more trustworthy than Tsarist Russia. Second, and linked, was the Suez Canal. Britain’s link to India had to be protected. And hasn’t the importance of the Suez Canal been brought into sharp focus today – first when the canal was blocked for just six days when the giant container ship, Ever Given, got itself stuck and then with Houthis attacking shipping in the Red Sea. And thirdly, and a new part of British thinking, was protecting the supply of oil from Mosul, that had been a part of the Ottoman Empire as well as from Persia (today’s Iran). The Sykes-Picot agreement would have meant the Mosul oilfields would be in the French sphere of influence and any pipeline would pass through it too. Mosul is about 200 kilometres (or 120 miles) north of Kirkuk where the original line was drawn. But before the war, German geologists researching the area felt that Mosul had the largest undeveloped resources in the world (known at that time, of course). Lloyd George was convinced and made it a war aim so as to present the French with a fait accompli and four days after the armistice was agreed with Turkey, the British took the city.
As for France, with the German army twice crossing the River Marne with Paris almost within reach, it had been in an existential fight. But with the war over, it wanted its share of the spoils, as agreed by Sykes and Georges-Picot. French imperialists would argue this was necessary in order to ensure France could recover from the war and to ensure France was strengthened vis-à-vis Germany. Besides, as I hinted at in the previous episode, French interests held 60% of Turkish debt and the French money lenders had already got their fingers badly burned when the Bolsheviks refused to take any responsibility for the Tsarist regime’s debts.
But both Lloyd George and Clemenceau had accepted that their imperial ambitions would have to be disguised as mandates of the League of Nations. That was the only way they would get past Wilson. But there was still the mandates to fight over and the French began their fight by trying to exclude Feisal, who they saw as nothing more than a paid British lackey, from the peace conference. But the British protested and Feisal had his day, addressing the conference with Lawrence acting as his interpreter. Hardly surprisingly, Feisal made a bid for American support, calling for self-determination for Arabs. And the Americans were, indeed, impressed. And all attempts by the French to undermine Feisal (and Lawrence) backfired.
But with the conference not yet two months old (and the treaty that dealt with Turkey and the Old Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of Sevres would not be signed until August, 1920) the British and French were already at loggerheads. It was a far cry from the pre-conference meeting between Lloyd George and Clemenceau. There was an unholy row between Lloyd George and Clemenceau over the British negotiated armistice with the Turks. Ironic as they were arguing over the Holy Lands. France thought it should have been involved. This drew an angry response from Lloyd George who told Clemenceau that while Britain had suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties fighting the Turks, other countries “had only put in a few nigger policemen to see that we did not steal the Holy Sepulchre!” A racist slur referring to the use of French colonial troops as well as an angry outburst. And as Clemenceau later pointed out, repeating Georges-Picot’s argument, if Britain had used its troops deployed in the Middle East on the Western Front, perhaps the war might have been over sooner. Britain was reneging on everything that had been agreed with France, including Syria which it now argued should be handed to the Arabs and in another fiery exchange Clemenceau accused Lloyd George as being “an enemy of France”, to which the British prime minister replied, “was it not always our traditional policy” and, indeed, Lloyd George was determined to renege on the Sykes-Picot agreement. Clemenceau would tell his president, Raymond Poincaré that Lloyd George, “has managed to turn me into a Syrian.”
As for America and President Wilson, we have already noted in the last episode (war manoeuvrings) his anti-imperialism and his 14 Points on which he was determined the peace treaties should be based and which included self-determination. And he came to Paris opposed to Britain’s opportunism, trying to profit from the war, and he was specifically opposed to a British Protectorate over both Palestine and Mesopotamia. And with Lloyd George and Clemenceau at loggerheads, Wilson suggested a commission to ask the Arabs themselves what they wanted. And that would really put the cat amongst the pigeons.
But there was another factor that should have featured more prominently in both British and French thinking, and that is the consideration of the fact that the vast majority of Arabs, and a majority of Turks, were Muslim. This mattered, then, when decisions about the future of the Ottoman Empire were under discussion, the decisions about Turkey too, and while for France, as we have noted, it mattered when we consider France already had an empire in north Africa, and it mattered for Britain in Egypt and India (and there was unrest in both countries) and elsewhere in its far-reaching empire.
A deputation to Lloyd George from the All-India Muslim League, and remember, Muslims made up a quarter of India’s population, expressed the deep concern felt by Indian Muslims and served as a reminder that Muslims shouldn’t be forgotten. The Sultan was their spiritual leader and must not be deposed nor his caliphate broken up. It was urged that he at least be left responsible for Muslim holy places. A deputation to the Supreme Council at the Parice Peace Conference (essentially Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau) from the Aga Khan, the spiritual leader of Shia or Shiite Muslims and, in 1919, he was President of the All-India Muslim League, also asked for Turkey not to be broken – another reminder that what Muslims wanted should not be forgotten. But a conversation between Edwin Montagu, the British secretary of state for India, and Balfour summed up the feelings of the British government. “Let us not for Heavan’s sake,” Montagu said, “tell the Muslim what he ought to think, let us recognise what they do think.” To which Arthur Balfour, the British foreign secretary replied, “I am quite unable to see why Heavan or any other Power should object to our telling the Muslim what he ought to think.” Even if we think this conversation took place in 1919, the arrogance, the racism implied, is quite staggering. Lloyd George, however, was more sensitive to Montagu’s warnings.
Putting aside British and French imperial manoeuvrings, as far as the peace conference was concerned, the issue in the Middle East was two-fold: what to do with the former Turkish territories and what to do with Turkey itself. And by the way, I should make clear that if you have come across the term in other reading, the region when we talk about Lebanon, Syria and Palestine (and today’s Israel), we are talking about a region that is often referred to as the Levant. The argument coming from Britain and France was that the Turks had lost all right to govern other people (no one disagreed with that) but the Arabs weren’t yet ready to govern themselves. So, mandates would be necessary so that they could be guided towards self-rule. Britain and France had, of course, already divvied up their portions.
Lloyd George though, was worried about divisions, and so trouble, amongst the Arabs themselves, and so the cost of keeping the peace, and he hoped America would be interested in a mandate for Armenia, perhaps a Kurdistan, and perhaps for the Straits too. Others though, particularly the navy, were uneasy about swapping a threatening Russian presence for an American presence at the far end of the Mediterranean. President Wilson was tempted and at different points gave American mandates his serious consideration but the American people would never have accepted any American responsibility in such a far-flung place at that point in history; America was about to retreat into isolationism. And in any case, America was in a tricky position when it came to dealing with Turkey: they had never declared war on the Ottoman Empire.
But what was very clear, was that the Turks would lose their empire. When a delegation from the Sultan presented their case to the Big Three – Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau – they pleaded that they be allowed to keep their empire, blaming past misdeeds on their predecessors. But Clemenceau, for once spoke confidently for all three when he said, “Neither among the Christians of Europe nor among the Muslims of Syria, Arabia and Africa, has the Turk done other than destroy wherever he has conquered.” Case dismissed. Incidentally, it was the only time a delegation from the defeated powers was allowed to present their case before a treaty had been written. But the Turks caught them just at the point they were waiting the response from Germany regarding their treaty – a WHOLE other story – and so they gave them a hearing.
And as we are about to get down to the nitty gritty in the negotiations, I’ll pause and pick it up next week.
Manoeuvrings in Paris
This episode continues our look at the crucially important Paris Peace Conference, getting down to the nitty gritty of the negotiations that did so much to shape the way the Middle East looks, AND FEELS, today.
The issue of the Ottoman Empire, the old Turkish Empire, had really boiled down to whether the French should have the Syrian mandate (which would include Lebanon). The French added to their argument that, having defended Christians in Syria since the Crusades, they should be allowed to continue to do so, by pointing to the French-run schools, the French-run hospitals, the French railway system, that the gas and electricity works were French and that Beirut’s port was run by the French.
But it was when President Wilson suggested the commission to enquire as to what the Arabs wanted, that the British arguments against a French mandate for Syria ebbed away (as attempts to sideline Lawrence increased). They were sure that the Arabs would want self-rule in Syria but even if the feeling amongst Arabs in Mesopotamia at this point favoured a British presence, and that was not certain, once they saw an independent Arab state in Syria, they would soon want the same. The oil in Mosul had to be under British control. And as for Palestine, the Arabs would not accept what Britain had in mind for a Jewish state, something which the commission would surely expose. But what was also a factor in the change to British thinking, and this is quite staggering, is that, with the draft terms for the treaty with Germany written, there were those in the British delegation, including Balfour who thought that a future war with Germany was a possibility and so it was better to keep on friendly terms with France: “We have not been honest with either French or Arab.” he said, “… it was now preferable to quarrel with the Arab rather than the French, if there was to be a quarrel at all.” So, in the midst of our look at the roots of the Middle East’s problems, we see an admission by leading British delegates that the treaty they were about to impose on Germany might well lead to another war. Truly staggering – think of the rise to power of Hitler aided by that treaty, think of the loss of lives in that second war with Germany, and think of the Holocaust and the Israeli state that resulted from that nightmare.
There was a commission, it was known as the King-Crane Commission, but the British and French had nothing to do with it and did not take part, except, that is, to try and sway its findings. Indeed, the British managed to persuade the commission not to visit Mesopotamia but they did provide the commissioners with reports of local opinion, one such report saying, ‘There are the Sunnis and the Shiahs, the townsfolk and the tribes. There must be some outside authority to keep the peace between them’. Understandably, the commission was left suspicious of British manipulation, even more so of French manipulation, which had been even more heavy-handed than the British. Nevertheless, the commission did carry out its enquiries and concluded that whilst Britain should be mandated Mesopotamia, America should take on the mandate for a united Syria and Palestine with Feisal made head of state. And as for the Zionist project, it would require a ‘serious modification’ if war between Arab and Jew was to be avoided. Now hold onto that for a minute: an American commission in 1920 recommended a united Syria and Palestine and expressed grave concern that a Jewish state would lead to conflict between Arab and Jew, and that America should take on the mandate. As we’ve noted, in the past episode, Wilson might have been tempted but the American people would never have accepted such an idea.
Meanwhile, French nationalists were left furious, both with the commission and the British who they accused of manipulating anti-French feelings amongst the Arab population of Syria. And these accusations were taken up by the French press. Meanwhile, Lawrence was still doing everything he could to undermine French support and put as much support behind Feisal as possible. But what Lloyd George proposed would affect things on the ground much more than the commissions conclusions. Lloyd George, by this time, was worried about the cost of maintaining a presence in Syria and, in truth, it was that more than any other consideration that led him to clear the way for the French to have the Syrian mandate after all. The British would clear out of Syria and withdraw to Palestine, but would hand over Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo (all places we have come to know from the recent Syrian civil war) to Feisal. Leaving Feisal and the French to sort things out between them.
But they had no idea as to where a Palestinian border with Syria should be. Religious authorities couldn’t help – there was no historical, cultural or religious basis for a border. So, the border was based on British needs: access to water, land that would enable a railway to be built from Mesopotamia to a Mediterranean port (and a future pipeline), and a territory that would enable Britain to protect the Suez Canal. Lawrence’s last words on the matter was that the decisions being made would only store up future trouble. He wasn’t wrong! Feisal, on being told of Lloyd George’s plans at a point too late for him to do anything about them, told the British prime minister that in medieval times, a slave “had had the right to demand to be sold to another master. He hoped that in the twentieth century at least that right would be preserved.” I don’t think any comment I’ve seen in this sorry tale, better expresses the helplessness of Arabs as they faced the imperialist manoeuvrings of the British and the French. And, of course, Feisal would not be able to prevent France taking complete control of Syria.
But the French would have a hard time in Syria. The French faced multiple problems. First of all, they didn’t have enough feet on the ground to take control. They were far too short in numbers. Secondly, though they tried to strike a deal with Feisal, the truth of the matter was that Feisal couldn’t control the nationalists. Clemenceau proposed that Syria accept the French mandate, thus accepting a French military and economic presence and French control of Syria’s foreign policy. Additionally, Syria had to recognize the independence of Lebanon under a separate French mandate. This is the Syria Faisal would rule, not exactly what he thought he had been promised. From the point of view of Clemenceau, these were generous terms: “No other French politician would have agreed to let Arab Syria retain a certain measure of independence or offered to let the pro-British Feisal remain in Damascus, let alone as Syria’s monarch.” Arab nationalists thought differently, however, and they would have nothing to do with it, and in March, 1920 the General Syrian National Congress declared Syria’s independence and that it should include Palestine and Lebanon, they proclaimed Feisal king and his brother, Abdullah, emir of Mesopotamia which, the congress said, should be independent though have political and economic union with Syria (so, I don’t know how independent it would, in fact, be). It left the British concerned about Palestine and Mesopotamia, and they now refused to help the French in Syria. And the French retaliated by threatening to withdraw their support for a British mandate in Palestine, and opting instead for an international mandate.
Now a number of important things had happened by this point in order to put what was happening in the middle East in context. The treaty with Germany, the Treaty of Versailles had been signed in January, 1919, and with the League of Nations and the main treaty dealt with as well as the principles of the other treaties, Wilson had left for America in July, never to return. He would suffer a stroke in September and the American Senate would reject the peace treaties and membership of the League of Nations. American delegates were still at the peace conference, however, and the Treaty of St Germain that dealt with Austria was signed in September, the Treaty of Neuilly that dealt with Bulgaria at the end of November, and the Treaty of Trianon that dealt with Hungary would be signed in June, 1920, leaving only the Turks and the former Ottoman Empire left to sort out. But a conference at San Remo on the Italian Riviera had been arranged for the end of April 1920 to hopefully do that. Some hope. The French and the British were still at loggerheads even though the Tiger wouldn’t be at San Remo. Clemenceau had resigned the French premiership in order to fight in the presidential election (a fight he lost).
So, in the end, after all the manoeuvrings and arguing, the loss of tempers and the falling out, the British did not oppose France’s mandate for Syria lest the French push for an international mandate for Palestine. The British also felt they had to agree to France taking a quarter share in the oil company, the Turkish Petroleum Company, that would be set up to extract the oil at Mosul.
So, as with other treaties, territory was lost, but in this case, or at least for the most part, it wasn’t in the name of ‘self-determination’ (though it was still used as a mask); it was more a matter of what the winners coveted. Britain wanted to protect its oil supplies (and gain more in taking Iraq) as well as control trade routes to India, most significantly by protecting the Suez Canal. While at the same time, France hoped to extend their influence in the region too. As we have seen, in many of the cases territory had already been claimed, but Turkey was obliged to formally acknowledge it. In total, Turkey lost two-thirds of its pre-war territory. And though the mandates were roundly criticised for “rewarding” France and Britain, and not just by Turkey, they happened anyway.
Next week, I’m going to focus on Turkey itself, a country we sometimes overlook when crises in the Middle East unfold, but a country that remains an important player in the region. I hope you found this episode interesting though – not only has it shown the seeds to the problems facing the Middle East today (and we will see how that developed in future episodes), but it shows the deep animosity of both Britain and France, and that too will grow in a way that I think will amaze you, despite the fact that the two countries would again be allies in a second world war, again with Germany as their mutual enemy.
Dealing with the Turks
As I said last week, this episode is going to take a look at how the peacemakers dealt with Turkey as we shouldn’t underestimate the significance of Turkey today. It has a different relationship to the countries of the Midde East, and Russia too, than do western European countries and America; while it is a member of NATO, and has been since 1952. And that alone makes it important.
So, we’ll look at the peace treaty that dealt with Turkey: the Treaty of Sèvres. But first of all, let me share with you a little bit of contextual history that I haven’t yet included. The Ottoman Empire had entered WW1 on the side of the Central Powers – Germany and Austria-Hungary, as then was. They were not a friend of Austria-Hungary but they had built up a close relationship with Germany. The Kaiser had visited Constantinople and the Holy Land in 1898 taking the opportunity to promise friendship to Muslims throughout the world. They saw Germany as a friend much more than they saw Britain and France as such. Britain had acquired Egypt from them (you may remember Egypt had, in fact, been a British protectorate since 1882, and by the way, Britain also took Cyprus from the Ottomans) and France, though it had provided loans to them, was not doing so out of any sense of altruism, but for their own benefit.
Now, the Ottoman Empire had been known as the “sick man of Europe” in the decades before WW1 and its European empire in the Balkans had been all-but lost before the war – to Austria-Hungary and in the Balkan Wars in which the Balkan states fought for their independence and which really gave birth to the Balkans as we know it today. It was to try and arrest this decline that led to the Sultan siding with the Central Powers but as we have seen, Mesopotamia, Greater Syria and the Arabian Peninsula were all lost as a result of the war.
Those that had taken Turkey into the war had fled on a German warship, though not the sultan. A Turkish provisional government agreed armistice terms with the British and waited for its fate to be decided at the Paris Peace Conference. They were naïve in the extreme, the empire was lost but they thought Turkey had been saved, that its territory would be respected and that it wouldn’t suffer any indignities, but they were wrong. Mustafa Kemal, the hero of Gallipoli and soon to be the hero of all of Turkey, and who would become better known as Ataturk, rushed to Constantinople and urged politicians and the sultan himself to set up a strong national government that would stand up for Turkey but the sultan thought appeasement was the best policy and he dissolved the Turkish parliament and tried to govern through his own men. But the British and French were determined to make the Turks pay for their viscous misrule. The oppression of the different nationalities in the Balkans would not be forgotten, nor the massacres of Armenians during the war.
Following the armistice, Turkey itself, including its capital, Constantinople, was occupied by an international force that included British, French, Greek and Italian forces. But dealing with Turkey at the end of WW1 would turn out to be as complicated and as seedy as the divisions of the old Ottoman Empire. Though we all know it today as Istanbul, Constantinople as it was known under the Ottomans and as I will refer to it in this episode, had one of the richest histories in the world. Up there with Athens and Rome, or London, Paris, Vienna or St Petersburg if we look at the more ancient European imperial capitals. And by the way, because I’m sure you’ve come across the name, the Greeks had named it Byzantium and it was also known as Byzantium in the days of the Roman Empire. Anyway, by the time of WW1, Constantinople was a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural city. Only half its population was Muslim, the other half was made up of Orthodox Greeks, Armenians, Albanians and Rumanians, as well as Jews (actually from Spain having fled persecution centuries earlier), and would you believe it, patriotic Poles who had fled persecution from the Tsar; all going to show that rich history.
The Greeks dominated trade and its Greek population held high hopes that Constantinople would be returned to Greece, though it was the northern Europeans who ran the most important industries and it was West European capitals, none more so than Paris, who kept the Turkish finances afloat with loans. Indeed, Constantinople and the whole Ottoman Empire had been in hoc to the capitals of Europe. All of which led to special privileges for Europeans including freedom from Turkish taxes. And at the end of the war, Constantinople was in desperate straits: without coal, without food, yet with refugees flooding into the city: Turks from the lost empire, Russians fleeing the civil war and Armenians in search of safety. As many as 100,000 of them were sleeping on the streets of the city. All of this is why Ataturk (and you will meet him properly soon) would later move the Turkish capital to Ankara, then a little-known city. Though he wouldn’t give up on Constantinople, its potential to return to greatness lay in its command of the Straits that linked the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.
As part of the Sykes-Picot agreement, the French were set to gain the south-east corner of Turkey as it turns at almost right-angles to the Mediterranean (close to Alexandretta). Both the Italians and the Greeks laid claim to stretches of the Turkish Mediterranean coast. Both used their ancient empires to lay historical claims, but in addition the Italians used the Treaty of London of 1915 at which, in order to bring Italy into the war on their side, Britain and France offered Italy amongst other things, ‘a just share’, should Turkey be divided up, and they followed this up, however reluctantly, in 1917 with a promise that Italy would have a sphere of influence stretching some way from the Turkish coast. Vague promises but Italy was now taking what it felt had been promised and interpreting those vague promises to maximum effect – Smyrna and its surrounds – was their chief focus – but it began occupying strategic parts of a long stretch of the coastline as soon as the war ended.
But the Greeks, with their own ancient claims, also had their eyes on Smyrna, and their claims seemed stronger, not least the fact that more Greeks lived there than lived in Athens and they ran the local economy. Though in the region as a whole, Turks constituted the majority and Smyrna would be crucial if the Turks were to revive their economy. The British and French leaned towards the Italian claim; the Americans sided with the Turks – all rational reasoning: the overall population mix and the economic needs, pointed to Turkey, and the Americans were also of the opinion that the Turks didn’t need outside powers with mandates overseeing their transition to democracy. Yet, the decision, when it was made, was that Smyrna should go to the Greeks. The Greeks had played a clever diplomatic game, the Italians had played a bad diplomatic game (they were boycotting the peace conference over another matter at the time the decision was made over Smyrna and had tried to bully their way in; but there would be trouble ahead!
If little account had been made of Muslim concerns in the old Ottoman Empire, even less concern was shown the Turks, it was simply assumed that they would do as they were told. Again, the arrogance of the imperial powers. In Smyrna, the mood was tense and when the Greeks arrived to take their prize, Greeks and Turks immediately clashed. By the end of the first evening, between 300 and 400 Turks had died, and around 100 Greeks. The following day, Ataturk left the Sultan’s court where the Sultan had wept at the news of Smyrna while his advisers talked of making some kind of protest, and left Constantinople, heading into Anatolia where he immediately began making his own plans, gathering support for a nationalist uprising. At this point, President Wilson suggested that France be handed the mandate to oversee Turkey (though the word itself was to be be avoided). This was the last thing the British wanted, however, and Lloyd George countered with the idea that the Americans should take that responsibility and include Armenia. And it was this that left Clemenceau in such a rage that it is said he offered Lloyd George a choice between pistols and swords – a duel Clemenceau was likely to win: he had been jailed in his youth for duelling.
However, final decisions about Turkey were not made until the same conference in San Remo in Italy in April, 1920 that we have already looked at with regard to the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Versailles with Germany was always the most pressing issue. Indeed, as we have noted, of the Big Three only Lloyd George attended the San Remo conference. Clemenceau had resigned as prime minister of France (to fight for the presidency, a fight he lost), though his successor was at the conference, and President Wilson had long since returned to America (he left Paris in July, 1919). This conference produced a draft treaty but the treaty itself, which came to be known as the Treaty of Sèvres, because, would you believe it was signed in the showroom of the Sèvres porcelain factory in Sèvres which is on the outskirts of Paris, was not signed until August, 1920; the last of the peace treaties to be signed. The Turks held a day of national mourning, prayers were recited and the papers were printed with black borders. Which I think says everything about what they felt.
The Treaty of Sèvres dealing with Turkey and the Ottoman Empire was harsh, very, very harsh. The Turks had to accept that all the countries of their former empire, including Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Armenia, as well as the Middle East countries we have looked at were now independent or were under British or French protection. It wouldn’t in fact happen for Armenia but it had been the intent of the peacemakers. Provision was also made for a homeland for the Kurds: Kurdistan, which would become an autonomous region within Turkey (though like Armenia, Ataturk saw to it that this didn’t happen either). Constantinople, along with the Straits, remained Turkish but was put under international control and demilitarised with all fortifications in the region destroyed. Russia had long wanted control of the waterways that made the city so important: the Straits as they were called – the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, as along with the Sea of Marmara, they would link Russia’s Black Sea coastline with the Mediterranean, so important for exporting Russian wheat as well as for naval power (and why Crimea is so important to Russia today). But the Bolshevik Revolution and Russia’s separate peace treaty with Germany had put paid to any hopes of that. Instead, Turkey’s ports were made free zones. They were put under the control of the League. In addition, Greece gained East Thrace (the European side of the Straits except for the area surrounding Constantinople) and took control of Smyrna which would become Greek in everything but name. France and Italy would have spheres of influence too.
Now, as we have also seen, the Ottoman Empire had been heavily in debt even before the war, and Turkey’s national finances were placed under strict control, including its budget, and the Ottoman Bank too. Yet like all the other powers held responsible for the war, it was required to pay severe reparations (think of it as a kind of fine). Its army was restricted to 50,000 men and there would be no conscription, its navy would be tiny and it was not allowed to have an air force. What is more, the Allies were empowered to hold military tribunals for Turkish war criminals, notably those involved in the genocides. As with all the other defeated powers, Turkey was obliged to accept the League of Nations without being invited to join it.
So, there we have it. After all the arguments in Paris and at San Remo, the Turks had been dealt with. The effect of the Treaty of Sèvres would have been to turn a once great imperial power into a colony itself. Except the Turks, and one Turk in particular, were not prepared to accept that. But that’s for next week.
Enter Ataturk
Last week, we looked at how the allies dealt with Turkey. Not just Britain and France, but this time Greece and Italy playing their part too, with the Americans trying to ensure the Armenians and Kurds were protected. However, even by the time of the San Remo conference, the Turks were fighting back, determined that Turkish independence, Turkish sovereignty, should be preserved.
I said you would meet Mustafa Kemal or Ataturk properly, well, now’s the time. I’ve given hints of his place in Turkish history and now it’s time to do that properly too. Because you can’t understand modern Turkey and what Erdogan has done with Ataturk’s Turkey unless we go back to what Ataturk established.
Kemal, as I will call him for now (you’ll see why) had already issued the Amasya Circular in 1919 that proclaimed Turkey to be an independent state and he went on to lead the Turks in the two-year War of Turkish Independence. He had established a strong base in Ankara, in the heart of Anatolia, with more nationalists joining it after the details of San Remo became known, and by the end of 1919, Ankara had become a rival capital to Constantinople and Kemal was in control of more than a quarter of the Turkish heartland. In June, 1919 he had issued a national pact stating simply that the lands occupied by Turks, including Constantinople (and including Smyrna) must remain a whole. When, in March 1920, the occupying forces in Constantinople arrested most of the Ottoman Parliament, dissolving the elected Chamber of Deputies leaving only the Sultan and his appointed Senate, those Members of Parliament who escaped arrest fled to Ankara, and Kemal proclaimed himself head of the new legitimate government, with significant support. He also called his own national parliament. What is more, Kemal responded to the arrests of Turks by grabbing as many Allied officers as he could find. And he was not going to accept any treaty agreed between the allies as a fait accompli for Turks to meekly accept.
The war that followed was a confused affair. Kemal fought against the Armenians, the French, the Greeks, and the Sultan’s army. Britain stayed out of the direct fighting, but provided support to the Greeks and to the anti-Kemalist Turks, and the Soviet Union supplied Kemal with weapons and supplies.
Armenia’s fate was sealed when Kemal made a deal with the Bolsheviks. They had little in common except they both bitterly opposed imperialists (mostly the British but all of them, really: France, Italy and Greece, and their friends, the Americans, included). And as the Bolsheviks moved on Armenia from the north, so did Kemal’s forces from the south. An appeal was made to the League of Nations even though it wasn’t yet formed, an appeal was made to America but already President Wilson had all-but lost his fight with the isolationists. And Britain turned its back. The Bolsheviks (with Stalin negotiating for them) and the Turks divided the spoils. And as I’ve mentioned, the notion of an autonomous Kurdistan was also lost before the ink had dried on the peace treaty.
Meanwhile, in-between San Remo and the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, the Greeks moved out of Smyrna to take control of its surrounding area. The Greeks also moved into Thrace, a region on the European side of the Straits which in its north is now a part of Bulgaria, to its west is a part of Greece and to its east is a part of Turkey. But with the Armenians defeated, Kemal could turn his attention to the Greeks. Britain encouraged the Greeks to stand firm and they did more than that, pushing on toward Ankara only to over-extend their lines and when the Turks counterattacked, the Greeks were quickly pushed back and Kemal was soon in Smyrna and the Turks had their revenge. Then, in 1922, they advanced on Constantinople. While France and Italy washed their hands of Turkey, Britain, at first considered war, but decided to negotiate. An armistice was agreed and a second peace treaty, the Treaty of Lausanne, was agreed in 1923. There were some new faces: a commissar for the Soviet Union rather than an official of the Tsar’s Russia, Kemal’s nationalists rather than a humbled Turkey led by its Sultan (Kemal had sent him packing), Mussolini was there for the Italians, but the French and the British were there, and a humbled Greece. America only attended as an observer. A footnote to the Sultan’s demise – he was actually smuggled out of his palace in a British military ambulance and left Constantinople on a British warship. He would die in exile.
The terms of the new treaty were very different. The Turks didn’t get their empire back, that was never on the cards, but they got just about all their homeland back, including the Straits though they had to accept an international agreement on passage through them and the Greeks did keep Western Thrace. Turkey’s reparations were cancelled and the restrictions on its armed forces were removed. Tragically for the Armenians and the Kurds, no protection for minorities was secured. Armenia would not gain its independence until 1991 but the history of the Kurds has been truly tragic. And just as tragically, in the short-term at least, a compulsory transfer of Greeks and Turks was enforced: well over a million ethnic Greeks leaving Turkey and some 350,000 Greek Muslims heading the other way. Most Greeks had already fled, but now Muslims outside of Turkey’s agreed borders were forced to take what they could and leave what had been their family’s homes for perhaps generations. The only exceptions were Greeks living in Constantinople and Turks living in western Thrace. The one sticking point that almost scuppered the whole treaty was Mosul. The Turks claimed the Kurds living there were in fact Turks. Britain was having none of it though, not because they were determined to defend the Kurds living there but, as we know, because they wanted control of the oil that they were sure was also there. The dispute was referred to the League of Nations which decided it belonged to Iraq (which, as Mesopotamia, had been mandated to Britain).
Under the Treaty of Sèvres, Turkey would have been a weak and de-centralized monarchy, carved up into spheres of influence, by the Greeks, Italians and French, occupied by foreign troops, and lacking control over most of its economic and political institutions. Given the rapid collapse of most of the European colonial empires post-WWII, this would most likely not have lasted for long, but Turkey would have still been left scarred and weakened. Instead, Turkey became a republic, a secular state and a major regional power; and Kemal would serve as Turkey’s president from 1923 until his death in 1938, and would be given the name “Atatürk”, “Father of the Turks”, by Parliament in 1934.
And under Ataturk’s firm control, Turkey broke with its past more than could have been thought possible back in 1923. The caliphate that had existed since the sixteenth century was out; secularism was in. Turkey looked not to the south and the east, to the Arabs or a community of Muslims, but to Europe. This meant everything from banning the Ottoman fez in favour of European-style hats, replacing the Arabic script with the Latin-based Turkish alphabet in order to increase literacy; to replacing Islamic law with a European model, women’s suffrage as well as women’s rights and a ban on the Muslim call to prayer in Arabic. And Ataturk’s economic reforms, promoting education, science, and industry in the process, modernised Turkey and played a key part in pulling Turkey out of the deep poverty it suffered when the Ottoman Empire collapsed so that today, the country is a member of the Group of 20 most developed nations.
Ataturk was a complicated man, a man of contradictions: he was a dictator who wanted to bring about a democratic state. In power, he actually created an opposition party but chose its leaders, and closed it down when it opposed him. Crazy but there you go. But Turkey had a hero and he is still revered by many Turks. His image can be seen on countless streets, his portrait in countless offices, in schools and most telling of all, in homes. The anniversary of his death, November 10th, is a national holiday. In fact, Turks still keep a minute’s silence at 9.05, the time he died.
So, in this episode we have seen the birth of modern Turkey. We will come back to this important bridge between west and east, between America and Europe, the Middle East and Russia.