The German Revolution and the responses from Left and Right

The ways in which the Social Democrats, on the Left of German politics, and the traditional elites, on the Right, viewed the German Revolution is interesting. For though it showed differences, it also showed common ground. This points to the conclusion that Weimar could have been made to work but the reasons for the fact that it didn’t could already be seen in 1918-19.

Ebert and the Social Democrats were socialists and would work for a socialist economy, but they were also democrats, and passionately believed that the route for socialism should be democratic. That meant winning a free election and introducing reforms.

They were not revolutionary and wanted more than anything to avoid what had happened in Russia where they saw only chaos. Ebert, speaking of revolution, had once declared, ‘I hate it like sin.’^[1] Ebert and the Social Democrats were at one with the middle classes and the elites in that they saw only danger in the councils that had been set up, danger of uncontrolled radicalism, danger of Bolshevism and with that, the chaos that was the experience in Russia. The Social Democrat’s, then, were set on taking a democratic path. This meant an orderly path, but a democratic path needed a new constitution.

They were also pragmatists though, and fully understood that Germans – defeated, hungry and cold – first required peace, food, coal and shelter. They also had to organize the process of demobilization. They were also aware that they needed the middle classes and, too, the elites, social and economic, military and civil, if Germany was to be run properly.

But the Social Democrats would want a greater sense of equality in the new Germany, and this meant everything from voting rights for women to improved conditions for the working class and an even stronger welfare state than Germany already had. So, it would only ever be a marriage of convenience. For now, the elites needed them. First, to take the blame, and secondly, to stave off Bolshevism (an exaggerated fear, but nevertheless a very real fear).

The Right was appalled by the German Revolution. Robert Gerwarth quotes two of the political class. First, Elard von Oldenburg-Januschau, not a well-known figure but he was close to Hindenburg and was one of those who advised him in 1933 to accept Hitler as Chancellor. He described how he ‘could not find words to express my sorrow over the events of November, 1918; to describe how shattered I was. I felt the world collapsing, burying under its rubble all that I had lived for and all that my parents had taught me to cherish since I was a child.’

Whilst the former Chancellor, Prince von Bulow, said, ‘I have seldom witnessed anything so nauseating, so maddeningly revolting and base, as the spectacle of half-grown louts, tricked out with the red armlets of social democracy, who, in bands of several at a time, came creeping up behind any officer wearing the Iron Cross or the order Pour le merite, to pin down his elbows at his sides and tear off his epaulettes.’

This is the voice of the established Right, the traditional elite, and it didn’t bode well for the Weimar Republic.^[2]

Oswald Spengler, who wrote The Decline of the West, published in two volumes, the first in 1918, the second in 1923, was a major influence on the Right. He had argued in his books that Germany had no sooner been made than it was in decline, and would continue to be so unless that decline was arrested. He had this to say of the German Revolution:

‘I see that the German revolution has taken the typical course, slow destruction of the existing order [he was appalled at the way the Kaiser had been treated], collapse, wild radicalism, chaos. We need some harsh punishments…. A lot of blood has to flow, the more the better.’^[3]

His solution was a Prussian-led counter-revolution: Prussian nobility, officials and we can presume military leaders. But in 1918, with Germany in chaos, it was the Social Democrats who had had power thrust upon them by the traditional elite who wanted nothing to do with the mess they were responsible for.

Ebert was not charismatic, nor a particularly good orator, but he was a calming influence and a good negotiator. He was a parliamentarian too, and had worked hard to forge a war time alliance with the Centre Party and left-leaning liberals to strengthen parliamentary influence. As we have noted, he was also pragmatic, improving the lot of the German worker was more important to him than any ideology. He had even been a reluctant advocate of the Kaiser’s abdication, only accepting it as preferable when it seemed revolution would break out if he didn’t abdicate. In 1918-19 his main concern was three-fold: stop the economy from collapsing, keep essential services going and restore law and order. His focus, then, was to save Germany from itself.

So, there you see that the Social Democrats were willing, eager even, to make this new start for Germany work. The established Right, the traditional elite, however, were bitter about how things had unfolded for Germany but were obliged to take a step back. It didn’t bode well.

[1] Quoted in William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 52

[2] Quotes from Robert Gerwarth. The Vanquished, pp. 102-3

[3] Quoted in Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany, pp. 25-6