“History is always about people”. It’s a mantra of mine. It serves to underline the importance of history – history is made by people, individuals, groups and the masses, and it affects the lives of human beings, for good or ill, and we only have the one life. It serves to show the dark side of mankind and the up-side, not least the resilience of the human spirit (something I’ve already mentioned I would like to look at in a future episode). And as I’ve hinted, it serves to show the importance of both leaders and the masses, and the decisions each makes – the masses do not have to follow where their leaders want to go, and in democracies at least, leaders are chosen.
Yes, there are movements in history – the “isms”, I call them. Whether these are political “isms” such as imperialism, nationalism, liberalism, socialism or communism (and I would include the likes of democracy and autocracy even if they don’t conveniently end in “ism” but totalitarianism is at least, in this respect, more helpful). Or there are the great religious movements: Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam and Islamism (the two are different) and the other great world religions. Or there are the great driving forces in history such as feudalism, the Renaissance, industrialisation or modernism.
There is also the role to be played by the media and propaganda. But I think I’m still on safe ground when I say that we still have to come back to people. For it is people who ultimately make the decisions: to embrace change or resist it, to accept a faith, whilst acknowledging others, or not to do so. To go to war or not. And the masses do not have to follow. Look at the peaceful collapse across the Soviet bloc and in the Soviet Union itself, all brought about by people power. The Arab Spring, the civil rights movement in America, today’s Black Lives Matter movement, the “Me Too” movement, the Mahsa Amini protests in Iran, the various movements advocating the rights of the LGBTQI communities (and I’m not being glib when I say that the growth of initials only serves to show the growth of this movement and the level of awareness it has raised) and I want to include environmental activism too. Yes, they don’t always bring about the degree of change people had wanted, proven by, for example, that Black Lives Matter is necessary more than fifty years after the civil rights movement in America, but I think they do show that people matter. And apologies to the many, many other examples I could have included if any of them are particularly important to you.
So, let’s first look at an example of the impact of two individuals in history who had a massive impact on their respective countries, the Gulf States as a whole, and, indeed, the world. I’m talking about Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini. I won’t be able to give the detail that each deserves, each would take a book, and it will still take me a few episodes to do justice but hopefully I can explore in enough detail to make us think. And this theme of people being at the centre of history is something I will return to again and again. In this episode I’ll focus on their rise to power. And straight away, this will set a contrast for whereas Saddam Hussein was always about power, Ayatollah Khomeini was always about an Islamic Revolution.
The rise to power of Saddam Hussein
Saddam Hussein’s childhood actually had similarities to those of both Hitler and Stalin. In at least two ways: He was an outsider (Hitler was an Austrian, Stalin was a Georgian) and all three had bullying violent fathers, or in Saddam’s case, a stepfather.
Saddam was born a Sunni Muslim, in a country in which Shiite Muslims were in a distinct majority. His father was a poor landless peasant, and it is thought his father died before he was born. His mother remarried and his stepfather was a violent bully and as a child, Saddam was to suffer from his bullying. His stepfather refused to send him to school (he didn’t begin to learn to read and write until he was ten years old). Instead, Saddam was involved in petty criminal activity and became a social outcast. He was saved by his mother’s brother who effectively became his foster father.
His name was Khairallah Tulfah. He had been an army officer but had been imprisoned in 1941 for taking part in the attempt to drive the British out of Iraq. It was when he was released from prison in 1947 that Saddam went to live with him. It was Khairallah who instilled into Saddam a strong sense of Arab nationalism, that the Arab nations should be united into a single nation, and with it, a hatred for the Hashemite monarchy that allowed Iraq to remain under the dominant influence of Britain. Khairallah also ensured that Saddam acquired an education.
Saddam’s uncle also inspired him to join the Ba’ath Party (most of whom were Sunni Muslims) which he did in 1957. Saddam soon got involved in violent anti-government activities. In 1958 he killed a local government official who had informed against his uncle. Though only 22, he was now known as a ruthless operator and a man of action. With that in mind, he was selected by the Ba’ath Party to participate in an attempt to assassinate Iraq’s ruler who had overthrown King Faisal, General Abdul Karim Qassem. The attempt, made in 1959, failed and Saddam, who had been wounded in it, fled into exile, first to Damascus and then to Cairo.
However, Saddam was also a skilful politician. He recognised that in Iraq, family and tribal connections could be really important sources of power. Saddam also admired Stalin and used similar ruthless methods in his rise to power. He returned to Iraq when General Qassem’s regime was overthrown in February, 1963, and replaced by a government formed from the army and the Ba’ath Party. The new Prime Minister, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, was a kinsman, the cousin of his uncle.
Saddam quickly made himself indispensable, though the Ba’athists were themselves soon ousted when the President, Abdul Salam Arif, moved against them in another coup in November. Saddam continued to align himself with Bakr and Bakr appointed him to the Ba’ath Party’s Regional Command, putting him in charge of security and the Party’s military organisation. However, he was arrested in 1964 for plotting a coup against President Arif, and was subsequently jailed. He had spent around two years in jail when, in July, 1966, he escaped and continued his work in the Ba’ath Party, plotting against the regime until it was ousted in a bloodless coup in 1968. It was Saddam who had first raised the idea of yet another coup in a meeting of the Regional Command.
With Bakr now President, Saddam became his right-hand man, Deputy Chairman (to Bakr) of the Revolutionary Command Council, the main decision-making and law-making body in the Iraqi government after 1968. He was a central figure in the new government. From 1972 he was probably as important as Bakr, but moved cautiously, lest he be singled out as over-ambitious, and it took 11 years before Bakr was persuaded (or bullied) into resigning the presidency.
Saddam made sure to control the key positions in the Ba’ath Party, in the government and in the army (just as Stalin had). Membership of the Ba’ath Party determined who was appointed to government posts and many of Saddam’s closest advisers came from the same Takrit tribe as he did. Several important members of his close family, including his two sons, held important posts in the government. Having control of the party’s security services also helped him uncover or invent plots to oust him. He used these plots – real or invented – to target potential rivals, either civilian or military.
Saddam showed his ruthless streak, and again he was inspired by Stalin. To instil fear into people, he would imprison, torture or execute members of other parties or even members of his own party and the army if they opposed him, or were suspected of doing so.
Then, in 1979, President Bakr, who had health problems, was “persuaded” to resign (it is thought by many that Saddam had threatened to oust him by force if he didn’t resign). At the age of 42 Saddam Hussein became the undisputed leader of Iraq.
The rise to power of Ayatollah Khomeini
Iranians didn’t like the way in which the Shah was in the pockets of the West: Western powers seemed to still be making the important decisions and took so much of the profits from Iranian oil. Their Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadeq, who was hugely popular and who had nationalised the oil companies (though they would still receive 40% of the profits), had been ousted and placed under house arrest and their parliament dismissed in a palace coup aided by MI6 and the CIA. The Shah even supported the right of Israel to exist. Nor did they like the way the Shah had allowed Iran to be Westernised. The Shah allowed the import of American foodstuffs which undercut local farmers; and American-style shopping malls undercut bazaar merchants. Restrictions on women were further eased when a reform of family law required husbands to ask their wife’s consent before taking another wife. There was also deep unease when cinemas began showing foreign, un-Islamic, films. Britain and America even dictated general government policy.
The pace of change only increased when, in 1963, the Shah launched his “White Revolution.” The main features of the ambitious programme were land reform, industrial expansion, and education and health reforms. It all sounded positive but its results were disappointing and failed to build him support. Literacy among children was improving but adult illiteracy remained high and few Iranians graduated to higher education. Health reforms increased the number of doctors, nurses and hospital beds but as late as the mid-1970s Iran still had one of the worst doctor-patient ratios and infant mortality rates in the region. Criticism also focused on the Shah’s expansion of his military capacity: by 1975 Iran had the largest navy in the Persian Gulf, the largest air force in Western Asia and the fifth largest army in the world.
By the time the Shah was finally deposed, there was still a vast contrast between the rich elite and the poor masses: by the late 1970s the richest 10% accounted for almost 40% of total expenditure, compared to little more than 1% of total expenditure from the poorest 10%. Most villages lacked piped water, electricity, roads and other basic services. And in Tehran, the contrast between the rich in their luxurious palaces and the poor in their shanty town hovels, without the most basic services, was stark indeed. In a country where millions struggled to feed themselves, the Shah celebrated the dubious 2,500th anniversary of the Persian monarchy at a cost of $330 million. Despite the fact that much of the profits from oil still went to the west, oil revenues had nevertheless increased and Iran was clearly an extremely wealthy country but the majority of the population continued to live their lives in squalor whilst the wealthy few insensitively displayed their wealth. It was not surprising then, that by the mid-1970s there was widespread opposition to the Shah, both from society at large and political groups.
After Mossadeq was overthrown, the Shah made sure that his government and the reassembled parliament were packed with his supporters. Prime Ministers were usually hand-picked, and ministers were mostly young and Western educated and prepared to accept the Shah’s leadership. Then, in 1975, the Shah decided to establish a one-party state. The secret police, SAVAK, established in 1957 with the help of the FBI and the Israeli Mossad (again, the insensitivity), was expanded into an organisation of 5,000 agents as well as an unknown number of informers. It was known for its brutal tactics, including torture, forced confessions and summary executions (executions without trial). It also imposed censorship and carefully screened government and university appointments.
With parliament suppressed, opposition was led by Muslim religious leaders (mullahs) who criticised the wealth, luxury and corruption of the Shah, as well as the Shah’s close relationship with the non-Muslim West. This opposition had a persistent, regular and “loud” voice at Friday prayers (attended by all male Muslims). The mullahs also encouraged street demonstrations, targeting banks with close ties to the West, or the cinemas showing foreign, un-Islamic, films. For its part, the Shah and his government attacked the Muslim clerics.
Indeed, the Shah’s government launched a concerted attack on the mullahs. They tried to control what mullahs were allowed to preach, barring them from getting involved in political matters. Some mullahs were banned from preaching altogether. Mullahs were hounded by SAVAK, arrested and imprisoned for provoking opposition; some were forced into exile, like Ayatollah Khomeini. But one of the most insensitive, and unnecessary acts, was the introduction of a new imperial calendar in 1976 which replaced the Muslim calendar, the date changing overnight from 1355 to 2525.
Ayatollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the revolution, was not just a leading Muslim cleric and scholar, but was also a political activist who had been forced into exile in 1964 for undermining the Shah with his preaching and writing. In exile, he was to become the leading voice of opposition to the Shah. He was particularly critical of the Shah’s acceptance, even encouragement, of foreign influences.
From his exile in Iraq, his writings and speeches were smuggled into Iran, often in the form of cassette tapes. He didn’t call for an Islamic Revolution, an Islamic theocracy, rather he focused attention on the grievances resulting from the Shah’s rule: the Shah’s support of Israel against the Muslim world, for spending oil revenue on the military instead of improving the lives of ordinary Iranians, his neglect of the plight of rural villages, and his failure to combat crime and alcoholism. And if he criticised these things, then he would do something about them. He promised to remove class differences and he promised to give land to the peasants. He astutely coined a series of catchy phrases that could be used on the streets. For example, “Islam represents the slum dwellers, not the palace dwellers.”
The Shah responded by deploying his secret police which became his eyes and ears. It arrested, imprisoned and tortured, or else exiled, thousands of government critics, including mullahs. Some were even summarily executed.
When international pressure (instigated largely by the newly elected American president, Jimmy Carter) led to a relaxation of such brutal methods in 1977 (including the release of a number of political prisoners), the opposition’s voice only grew louder, issuing newsletters, publishing manifestoes and generally organising protests.
Throughout 1978 there were strikes and huge anti-government demonstrations. Matters weren’t helped by the Shah’s attempts to curb inflation which led to spending cuts which, in turn, led to increased levels of unemployment and added to the people’s hardships. The protests in Tehran were often a million-strong. The army were deployed to confront them as well as the police, and the deaths of protestors, forty had died in Qom, home of Ayatollah Khomeini, and a hundred in Tabriz, made them martyrs and only led to more and bigger demonstrations. In September, 1978, military rule was introduced. The following day, a day that came to be known as ‘Black Friday’, a huge demonstration resulted in the deaths of 500 demonstrators. The Shah was killing his own people, and by the end of the year some soldiers refused to fire on the crowds, and there were many more who sympathised with them. In October, strikes crippled industry and brought oil production to a halt. The Shah was losing control
For his part, Ayatollah Khomeini spent the last months of his exile in France, still directing the opposition to the Shah. This culminated in the mass rally held in Tehran on December 11th, 1978 which involved a crowd of two million Iranians, calling for the return of Ayatollah Khomeini and demanding “The Shah Must Go” and that his regime should be replaced by an Islamic Republic.
On January 16th, 1979, the Shah left Iran in order to receive medical treatment for his cancer. He would not return. On February 1st, Ayatollah Khomeini returned, greeted by more than three million Iranians. With the army declaring itself neutral, the Islamic Revolution was completed in just ten days. A national referendum produced an overwhelming majority in favour of abolishing the monarchy and establishing an Islamic republic. Iran, the Gulf and the Middle East, and of course, oil production, had another source of serious instability.
So, we have two individuals in power in the Gulf that, as I said, were to have a massive impact not just on their respective countries, but on the Gulf States as a whole, and, indeed, the world. These two men were going to shake things up and the world is today a very, very different place, far less stable, than before they came to power.
The nature of rule in Saddam’s Iraq and Ayaltollah Khomeini’s Iran
Saddam is often described as a dictator, enforcing his vision of how a society should be, the policies that will make that vision a reality, and destroying anyone who thought differently. The offices he held – President, Prime Minister, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (the RCC) and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces would suggest that he liked to have personal control of all the key offices of the state as well as the Ba’ath Party. And he consciously modelled his regime on that of Joseph Stalin. For example, he relied on a small group of trusted Party associates and, he relied to a considerable degree, on terror, and he used show trials and purges to great effect too. But one thing that was different to Stalin’s regime, was his reliance on family members – his sons, his uncle and father-in-law, half-brothers and cousins – to fill government and local government posts.
Once Saddam had replaced Bakr as president, he immediately set out to deal with those who questioned his power. His presidency started with the “trial” of Muhie Abdul-Hussein Mashhadi, the RCCs Secretary-General who had demanded a vote on the validity of the process that had made Saddam supreme leader. He was relieved of his duties and accused of being part of a plot to overthrow the Ba’athist regime. After being subjected to the most brutal intimidation that included threats to his family, Mashhadi was paraded before a meeting of the top leaders of the Ba’ath Party where he read out a prepared confession in which he admitted plotting to overthrow the Ba’athist regime. He named another sixty-six “co-conspirators” in the fabricated plot. Of these, twenty-two were executed, thirty-three imprisoned and eleven acquitted.
Following this high profile “trial”, a purge of the Ba’ath Party and the army was carried out with hundreds of Party members and military officers removed, many of whom were executed. Ba’ath Party members were threatened with the death penalty should they join another party. False accusations, followed by arrests, torture and then summary trials, followed by executions or else lengthy prison sentences became a regular feature of Saddam’s rule. Attempts to overthrow him met with a brutal response. For example, when an attempt to assassinate him was made in the village of Dujail to the north of Baghdad in 1982, nearly 150 villages were killed in retaliation.
Such brutal methods were complemented by the ‘carrot’ of economic well-being and social improvements. However, this spending was then used to cement his grip on power by means of indoctrination (another tool in Stalin’s kit). Saddam brought schools, trade unions, even sports clubs under government control. Almost every aspect of life was controlled: military, political, economic, and also social.
The purpose of education came to be the immunisation of Iraqi youth against foreign culture, ensuring instead the promotion of Arab unity. Young schoolchildren were taught Ba’ath ideas and to worship their glorious leader. Ba’ath Party youth organisations continued the process. If adults were less easily converted, they were nevertheless controlled. The media was tightly controlled, (tv stations were state owned) and strict censorship applied and criticism of the government was made a capital offence (so too was membership of an opposition party). Special courts were set up, run by the President’s office, and Saddam was never disappointed by their rulings. Membership of the Ba’ath Party was essential for any career in the army or the civil service, or for admission to university or college. The economy was a mixture of state owned and private companies but all were geared to the needs of the regime. And increased military spending kept the army happy, but they were also kept under control by regular indoctrination and by rotating officers.
Saddam cultivated popularity. He needed Iraqis to love him. He was glorified in the media, portrayed as the leader and protector of the Arab world (he criticised Egypt when it made a separate peace treaty with Israel in 1979) as well as of his own people. He was portrayed as all-powerful and as the father of the nation. There was a permanent exhibition about him in Baghdad, his life story featured regularly in newspapers and magazines and a film was made of his early life: “The Long Days.” His birthday was made a national holiday. The press, radio and TV regularly glorified his achievements. The evening news would begin with a “Saddam song” of which there were over two hundred (can you think of any politician you would happily sing their praise?). Streets and squares were named after him. There were statues of him everywhere, his portraits hung in all public buildings, and murals and paintings were commissioned. But Saddam also thought it was important for him to be physically seen, but even he couldn’t be in different places at once; or maybe he could! He used carefully trained lookalikes so that he could “attend” the maximum number of engagements. In a referendum on his presidency in 1995, 99% of Iraqis gave their support.
What of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution? For that’s what it was. In sharp contrast to Saddam’s personal power, Ayatollah Khomeini was always about Islam. I mentioned in the last episode that in the time of the Shah, Khomeinei’s writings were smuggled into Iran and that he downplayed the Islamic Revolution lest it prove, how can I put it, somewhat austere. Well, whilst in exile, a book was smuggled into Iran but distributed only to his most loyal supports. It was book that was compiled from a series of lectures he had given whilst in exile. It has been given various titles, the one I use is the most straightforward: Islamic Government. And he spells out what we would call a theocracy, a form of government shaped by a religion and its holy works. In this case, Islam, the Quran and sharia law.
The most important notion in the book is that of wilayat al-faqih or the guardian of the Islamic jurist (a Muslim cleric), and it is critically important as it came to form the basis of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, directing and controlling not only the government of Iran but Iranian society and every individual in it. Iran should not just be an Islamic republic but a clerical republic. The clergy should be the ruling strata in part because they are the true interpreters of Islamic law and the state exists solely to implement that law. And what is more, the Prophet, before his death, handed the duty and responsibility of guiding and leading the community to the clergy. And though Khomeini would listen to others, ultimately it was his word that, in effect, became law. But one interpretation of what, in fact, happened is that the revolution declared a “holy war”, not just on the West, but on its own people. Any disagreement or displays of discontent with Khomeini, his regime, or their policies was regarded as tantamount to opposing God and His Prophet. If you like, it was a return to ‘Divine Rule’ in medieval Europe. And it was just as brutal as Saddam’s regime in Iraq.
But I think it would be wrong to see Khomeini as a dictator in the way that we would see Saddam. Rather he is a devotee of Mohammad and of Islam. Though he saw himself as no better than any good Muslim, in truth he was an exceptional Muslim, shunning any of the material benefits his position might otherwise have provided. But he was convinced of his rightness and he was merciless in dealing with those who fell short of his interpretation of Islam, the Quran and sharia law. For only adherence to Islam would prevent arbitrary rule, oppression and social injustice. But it left him unwilling to compromise. How does a good Muslim compromise his beliefs? And it made him a dangerous force not just in Iran but in the Muslim world at large and, indeed, the world at large.
Now having mentioned Iran’s constitution, before I end this episode, let’s take a look at the constitution. At the top is the Supreme Leader who directs overall policy, He is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces and controls the Islamic Republic’s intelligence and security operations. He has the power to appoint and dismiss the leaders of the judiciary as well as the state media, its radio and television networks. He is the supreme commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. And as you will see, he also appoints six of the twelve members of the Council of Guardians. And it is an appointment with no fixed term attached to it.
The president is the second highest ranking official in Iran and he has a high public profile, however power is firmly in the hands of the Supreme Leader. Similarly, the Iranian parliament, although it drafts legislation, ratifies international treaties, and approves the country’s budget, it is in effect under the watchful eye of the Council of Guardians. The Council consists of twelve members, six of whom are appointed by the Supreme Leader with the other six recommended by the head of the judiciary who as we just noted is appointed by the Supreme Leader. The Council not only interprets the constitution but vets all laws passed by parliament to ensure they comply with sharia law, effectively giving the Council veto powers over parliament. The Council also vets whether presidential and parliamentary candidates are suitable and, indeed, it usually disqualifies an overwhelming majority of the candidates. There is also an Assembly of Experts, which meets once a year for one week every year. It consists of 86 “virtuous and learned” clerics elected by the people but not before the Council of Guardians decides who can stand for election. It is the Assembly of Experts that elects the Supreme Leader from within their own ranks and will periodically reconfirm him. So, if you’ve followed all the threads here, the Supreme Leader has his fingers in every pie. Indeed, he bakes every pie! And when, in 1988, there was a stalemate between parliament and the Council of Guardians, Ayatollah Khomeini created the Expediency Council to mediate between the two bodies. It also acts as an advisory body to the Supreme Leader, making it one of the most powerful governing bodies in the country, at least in name.
So much for governing the country, if we turn to controlling the people we also have a number of institutions to consider. The judiciary is largely controlled by the Supreme Leader. He appoints the head of the judiciary, who in turn appoints the head of the Supreme Court and the chief public prosecutor.
The Supreme National Security Council is responsible for ‘preserving the Islamic Revolution, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty.’ Its members include: the president; speaker of Parliament; the head of the judiciary; the chief of the combined general staff of the armed forces; the ministers of foreign affairs, the interior, and intelligence; and the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and the army. The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is responsible for all matters of defence, security, and foreign policy, and for the integrity of the Islamic Revolution. It is charged with ‘gathering, procurement, analysis, and classification of necessary information inside and outside the country.’ It is responsible for disclosing conspiracies that sabotage the integrity of the Islamic Republic. And, operating out of Iranian embassies, consulates, and Islamic centres, it has organised and conducted terrorist operations in other countries. The head of the MOIS must be a cleric, which strengthens the Supreme Leader’s influence. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard is also responsible for protecting the revolution and its achievements and has also become involved in supporting Islamic revolutionary movements in other parts of the Muslim world, for example Lebanon and Palestine. It operates with a large degree of independence.
As you would expect, the courts deal with both civil and criminal cases. But there are also “revolutionary” courts that try certain categories of offenses, including crimes against national security, drug smuggling, and anything that undermines the Islamic Republic. Decisions made in revolutionary courts are final, they cannot be appealed.
There is also a Special Clerical Court which functions independently of the regular judicial framework and is accountable only to the Supreme Leader. It mostly deals with crimes allegedly committed by clerics and its decisions are also final and cannot be appealed.
And there I will finish this episode with Saddam and Ayatollah Khomeini firmly in power and ruthlessly in control.
The impact of Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini on history and on people’s lives
In order to properly unify Iraq, Saddam had to deal with two groups who would never be reconciled to his Sunni regime and so had to be suppressed: the Kurds, who constituted 20% of the population, and the Shiites, who constituted 60% of the population (meaning the ruling Sunni’s themselves only constituted 20% of the total population). Previous regimes had adopted a mixture of diplomacy and force. Saddam preferred ruthlessness and brutality.
The Kurds in Kurdistan, the oil-rich north of Iraq, had gained a degree of self-rule but still, many of its leaders and the Kurdish people as a whole (there are significant Kurdish populations in Turkey, Iran and Syria) wanted independence, a separate homeland, a truly independent Kurdistan. It was one of the truly tragic stories in history. And Saddam would have none of it, and in 1974-5 his forces attacked the Kurds. Many of its leaders were executed or driven into exile and the Kurds lost much of what independence they had gained over the years. However, the Kurds had received help from Iran, and when Iraq and Iran went to war in 1980 (more of which in the next episode, Iranian help enabled them to claw back some control. In response Saddam’s planes bombed the Kurds, destroying half of Kurdistan’s villages and towns, killing thousands in the process.
When the Iran-Iraqi war over, Saddam set out to resolve the Kurdish problem once and for all. Chemical weapons were used – mustard gas and cyanide – as well as mass executions. Halabja, a Kurdish town, was the most notorious example. Planes spread poison gas killing 5,000 and inflicting injuries on a further 10,000. This was the campaign in which Saddam’s cousin, who became known as ‘Chemical Ali’, achieved notoriety. Saddam’s aim was to depopulate the region and in addition to the attack on the people themselves, whole villages were bulldozed to the ground. It is estimated that in total 180,000 Kurds were killed, and more than a million were displaced. Many fled to Iran or Turkey, others were placed in concentration camps located in the Iraqi desert.
The Marsh Arabs were also brutally dealt with when Saddam set out to construct a new waterway in the marshlands of the south-east of Iraq, their homeland. The construction of the waterway necessitated the destruction of the marshes, and with it, the culture of the Marsh Arabs. Some moved voluntarily, but others starved to death as their food source was destroyed, and others were, like the Kurds, attacked with chemical weapons. The population of the region dropped from 250,000 to approximately 30,000. If these were not actual acts of genocide, they were very like it.
Saddam also turned on the majority Shiite population. Iran was also mostly Shiite and its Islamic revolution left Saddam deeply suspicious of the Shiite population in Iraq, even though many were Ba’ath Party members. They did, however, want to be more involved in Iraq’s government, something Saddam couldn’t accept. As a result, between 1980 and 1981 some 200,000 Shiites, many of whom were successful businessmen but whose loyalty was questioned simply because they were Shiite, were deported to Iran, their businesses duly handed over to trusted government supporters. With the war with Iran over, and with Shiite revolts breaking out in a number of cities, Saddam responded ruthlessly. The Republican Guard stormed the rebel strongholds carrying out arrests and summary executions. Women and children were shot on sight, others were roped to the front of tanks as human shields.
But as I’ve already pointed out, he also used the carrot to win over the people. In 1958, some 55% of farmland was owned by just 1% of the Iraqi population. In 1970, limits were set on land ownership and surpluses were given to poorer farmers with more than a quarter of a million benefiting.
The nationalisation of the Iraqi oil industry provided funds to improve the lives of the Iraqi people in key areas such as education, health and welfare services, which came to be amongst the best in the world and were available for free. Saddam actually won an award from the UN for creating the best health service in the Middle East. Education was opened up to more people too: attendance at secondary school increased by two-thirds and there were nearly twice as many university students. Literacy classes were provided (with penalties if they were avoided). Again, the UN acknowledged the work that was done, UNESCO commending Iraq. Some poor families also received gifts of refrigerators or televisions.
Electricity was extended to the countryside and even remote villages were connected to the national grid, water supplies too, and agriculture was increasingly mechanised, dams were built, and transport was improved with new roads and bridges. The steel, petrochemical and coal industries were all modernised, often with foreign experts and technicians, but providing more jobs, and better paid jobs, for Iraqis. There were major building programmes of schools, hospitals as well as housing. A rail network was also constructed. And radio and television networks were established.
The daily life for many ordinary Iraqis consequently improved, average annual income rose remarkably from a little below $400 when oil was nationalised in 1972, to a little over $2,700 in 1979 (pensions rose too), and a new urban middle class of businessmen, lawyers and government officials grew. The money went further, too, as taxes were reduced and subsidies were placed on food. Car ownership, as one indicator, rose 150%. The arts, subsidised by the government, flourished too, and there was even freedom of religious worship.
Saddam was also determined to liberate women so that their talents could be fully utilised. ‘Our society will be backward and in chains’, he said in a speech to the General Federation of Iraq Women in April, 1971, ‘unless its women are liberated, enlightened and educated.’ And by 1980, a third of Iraq’s doctors were women, half of its dentists and half its teachers. Forced marriages were stopped and divorce was made easier too. However, there was a reaction to this liberalisation and as Saddam found himself needing support from the different tribes to keep him in power, reactionary practices, notably honour killings in cases of female adultery, were made legal, and women were banned from traveling abroad unless accompanied by a male relative on their father’s side of the family.
However, everything depended on individuals not getting on the wrong side of the regime.
So, what of life in the Islamic Republic of Iran? Well, it was as should have been expected in the Islamic Revolution. Adherence to the teachings of the Prophet and Sharia law was everything. And it was brutal to those who fell short of what was expected of them.
Western movies, music, and art were banned. We shouldn’t be surprised by this and Khomeini didn’t apologize for doing so. Instead, he made it clear that Iran’s ‘revolution was for Islam’. But this meant much more for ordinary Iranians than their choice of movie.
We in the West, for understandable reasons, focus on the suppression of women’s rights in Iran, but men, too, were oppressed. Revolutionary tribunals summarily tried and executed more than 600 of the shah’s former officials and army officers, as well as adulterers, homosexuals and persons who were found guilty of religious crimes. A 1987 report of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights estimated that as many as 7,000 people had been shot, hanged, stoned or burned to death since the 1979 revolution. It also thought that about 30,000 had been imprisoned. Amnesty International believed the number of executions in Iran during Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime was more than that in the rest of the world combined, and its numbers were based on conservative estimates. Torture was all too common, even in small cities with methods that included beating, whipping, burning, rape. Whilst Iran’s war with Iraq was not just a result of long-held border grievances or Saddam’s ambitions, it was also a result of Khomeini’s belief that Saddam had acted in an un-Islamic way and that his Islamic revolution should be exported (something that made the other Gulf states extremely nervous).
But it is important to focus on women, not least because of the Mahsa Amini protests in Iran today. Women had gained new rights under the Shah: to vote and stand for election, the legal age of marriage had been raised to 18 and women could initiate divorce and inherit property. And Ayatollah Khomeini’s pronouncements, before the revolution and in its immediate aftermath, suggested women’s rights would continue to be respected and women kept the right to vote and hold office, but things were made difficult for women, for example family planning advice (the whole notion seen as a Western idea) was ended and it was made more difficult to obtain contraceptives. And nurseries were universally closed so that women would find it more difficult to work. And Sharia law would prevail on all social matters. The age of marriage was lowered to just 13 and women were no longer allowed to initiate divorce, whilst they could be stoned to death for adultery. Restrictions on child custody and inheritance, on travel too, were also imposed, as a patriarchal culture dominated Iranian family life once more. Women were segregated from men on public transport with women required to sit at the back of buses. Girls and boys were segregated at schools (though it proved impossible to do so at university) and sports were strictly segregated. And strict restrictions were imposed on women’s dress code.
And, again, violations of Sharia law were brutally enforced. There was a report from the northern city of Tabriz of a woman, though wearing the full veil, found to be wearing lipstick by the local Islamic Revolutionary Guard. They took her to the city’s busiest intersection and flogged her: she received 101 lashes. And when a woman went to Khomeini’s chosen successor, Ayatollah Montazeri (he didn’t actually get the post), complaining that her teenage daughter had been raped before being executed, the Ayatollah pointed out that the execution of a virgin is forbidden in Islam.
Though, in an attempt at balance, it should also be said that under Ayatollah Khomeini the position of women was not as bad (if I can say that) as what we have seen in Saudi Arabia or under the Taliban. I know such things should be seen as the norm, but women were allowed to go to university and have careers (though there were some restrictions, for example women could be lawyers, even if it was discouraged, but couldn’t be judges). And as I’ve already noted, women kept the right to vote and to stand for election. They couldn’t be President but they could be a minister, though only one woman has held such a position. But life as it was in the days of the Shah was put firmly in the rear-view mirror.
And so, we see how individuals can have a terrible impact on millions of people, totally changing their lives. In these cases, we would say mostly for the worse, and I’m afraid history does tend to focus on the bad stuff.
The Iran-Iraq War, 1980–88
We’ve been looking at the impact of Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini on their people, and I’m going to end this season by taking a look at the Iran-Iraq War. Lasting eight years, from 1980 through to 1988, the Iran-Iraq War was one of the longest wars since WW2, and it was one of the most bloody. It is thought that around 500,000 died with those injured at least double that number and maybe a lot more. There was terrible brutality on both sides with many civilians amongst the casualties and there was massive destruction which only added to the suffering. What’s more, somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurds were killed by Iraqi forces.
Without Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq, a Sunni in a country in which the majority are Shiites, and a Shiite Islamic Revolution in Iran, it is very unlikely that we would have a war to explain.
For though there was the fact that the Persians in Iran had long been at loggerheads with the Arabs in Iraq (and elsewhere), and though there were good old-fashioned territorial disputes to consider too, it was the Iranian Revolution which totally changed the situation.
There are those who would argue that the war was a direct result of Saddam Hussein’s ambitions, though it could be just as forcibly argued that Saddam was only launching a pre-emptive strike in order to destroy Ayatollah Khomeini before Khomeini destroyed him. It is also possible to go much further back to the age-old contest for dominance in the Gulf States between Persians (Iranians) and Arabs (Iraqis). Most of Iran’s population, some 60%, is made up of people of Persian descent, whereas in the rest of the Gulf region, Arabs predominate. By the 1970s the two countries were still the only two serious contenders for leadership in the Gulf region. Only they had the financial and military resources to dominate the region.
But matters were further complicated by the division within the Muslim community. The Muslim population in the Gulf States is divided between Shiite Muslims and Sunni Muslims. As we have noted a number of times, most of Iraq`s population, more than 80%, were Shiite Muslims but Saddam Hussein was a Sunni Muslim. Also, as we have already noted, following the revolution, Iran had become a theocracy, a state governed by Islamic law; whereas Iraq was a secular state, meaning religion didn’t play a part in the government. Saddam had ambitions to lead the Arab world, particularly with Egypt expelled from the Arab League in 1979 following its peace treaty with Israel. But Saddam was also concerned about securing his regime. Ayatollah Khomeini, who regarded Saddam’s regime with contempt, had called on Shiite Iraqis to rise up, overthrow him and introduce a second Islamic republic. He said Saddam’s regime was un-Islamic, and in 1979-80 there were anti-Ba’ath riots in Shiite areas of Iraq. Shiite militants even began to assassinate leading Ba’ath politicians and officials. Saddam responded in kind and had the Shi’ite cleric, Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr killed, his sister too.
Saddam also had territorial ambitions and wanted to enrich Iraq. Iran had a long coastline and several ports from which to export its oil, whereas Iraq only had limited access to the sea: the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Its main port, Basra, some eighty kilometres up-river, as well as its only deep-water port, Umm Qasr were on the waterway. So, it was of vital importance to Iraq. Consequently, Saddam wanted complete control of the waterway which would secure its outlet to the sea. But the waterway was shared by both Iraq and Iran, with arguments over navigation rights as well as the precise location of the Iraq-Iran border on the waterway which had been flaring up since the sixteenth century. A treaty, signed in 1937, seemed to settle things in favour of Iraq, but in 1969 the Shah of Iran had rejected the treaty and refused to pay shipping tolls to Iraq.
With a shared border of more than 1,400 kilometers the fact that there were other disputed areas might hardly be surprising. Added to this, ethnic minorities exist in both countries. This was used by both Saddam and Iran to stir up trouble for their neighbour. For example, in Khuzestan, the oil-rich south-western province of Iran, the mostly non-Persian Arab population, with cultural connections to Iraq, had been encouraged to revolt against the Shah’s rule. Whilst Iran encouraged the Kurds in the north of Iraq to revolt against Saddam’s regime, even going so far as to provide them with training bases and military equipment.
Prior to the Khomeini–inspired revolution, Iran was too strong for Saddam (you may remember that in the early 1970s the Iranian army was the fifth strongest in the world). Consequently, Saddam agreed to a treaty with the Iranians, the Algiers Agreement of 1975. Both sides agreed to stop supporting minorities in each other’s country, Iraq dropped its claims to Khuzestan and a new borderline, favourable to Iran, was agreed on the Shatt al-Arab waterway.
The Iraqi’s had made more concessions than the Iranians in 1975. In the wake of the Shah’s fall in 1979, however, circumstances had changed. It now seemed an ideal time for Saddam to act as Iran had been weakened by the chaos leading to, and following, the Shah`s fall. Its economy was in chaos, its previously close relationship with America was destroyed and Iran was facing a wide Western trade boycott in the aftermath of the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran. Also, its armed forces, purged of most of its senior ranks following the Islamic Revolution, was demoralised and, perhaps more significantly, were deprived of American spare parts for its tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery.
Iran was in political chaos too, diplomatically isolated from America as well as from its Gulf neighbours who feared the spread of Khomeini’s Islamic revolution, and its military capacity had never been so weak. A short victorious war would put Khomeini and Iran in their place, it would strengthen Saddam’s regime and reinforce his credentials as leader of the Arab world. Delay would give Iran time to recover. And Iraq would benefit from the support given by Western and Arab countries who provided military, intelligence, economic, and political support.
Saddam made his first move, a diplomatic move, renouncing the Algiers Agreement. He wanted to position Iraq as the undisputed dominant power in the region, assert himself as the leader of the Arab world, and in the process seize control of Khuzestan and its oil and seize back control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway.
Saddam had built a considerable military force in Iraq, equipping his army with modern weapons. He obtained conventional weapons – tanks, artillery, surface-to-air missiles, bombers, helicopters, transport aircraft – mostly from the Soviet Union and France but also from other European countries, and as far afield as Brazil. But Saddam wanted non-conventional weapons as well – chemical, biological, even nuclear, weapons. Consequently, plants were built to produce a frightening array of such weapons. Significant quantities of Distilled Mustard, a blister agent, were produced, and Tabun and VX which attack the nervous system. Agents such as anthrax, typhoid and cholera were also produced. His nuclear programme was less successful though. His original research reactor, bought from France, was destroyed by an Israeli bombing raid. Further attempts to develop a nuclear capacity were thwarted by Allied bombing raids during the Gulf War. Still, by turning Iraq into a significant military power, he not only won the support of the military, but it enabled him to dominate his own people and try to dominate the Gulf region as a whole.
But Saddam felt that the best means of defence lay in attack, and in September, 1980 that’s what he did. Saddam predicted a ‘whirlwind war’ and at first, Iraqi forces faced little resistance. However, within a month, the Iraqi invasion was brought to a halt in the Iranian desert as ordinary Iranians, though with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to the fore, responded to save their country and their Islamic revolution.
After two years of fighting, Iran had recaptured all its lost territory and had cut off Iraq from its sea ports. The overthrow of Saddam’s regime was now the Iranian aim and calls for a ceasefire were ignored. However, now Iraqi forces were inspired to defend their homeland, and by 1984 both sides were bogged down in trench warfare along the 1,600-kilometre border. The war was compared to World War I as both sides dug in and a large-scale trench system was constructed, and mass attacks crossing a no man’s land, were mown down by machine guns and an extensive use of chemical weapons such by the Iraqis Iraq possessed a stronger arsenal of weapons but, as noted, the Iranians had a revolutionary fervour, willing to become martyrs in a holy war of good versus evil. They came in ‘human waves,’ hundreds of thousands strong. Some even carried their coffins as a sign of their willingness to die and be ‘martyred’ for the cause. Getting involved in the war was seen as a sacred duty.
In 1984, the war then moved into a particularly brutal phase when what became known as the ‘War of the Cities’ began as Iraqi forces fired Scud missiles (supplied by the Soviet Union) at Iranian cities and Iraq fired Scuds back (supplied by North Korea) before both sides bombed each other’s cities, killing hundreds of thousands of civilians. In 1988, by which time the Iraqi’s had air superiority, Tehran itself was attacked, causing the capital to be evacuated.
Saddam started to attack Iranian shipping from 1984 and by 1986 fighting was centred on the Gulf itself, each side attacking their enemy’s oil installations as well as their tankers. But whilst Iraq had air superiority, the Iranian navy was stronger and the Iranians responded by attacking not only Iraqi shipping but Saudi and Kuwait shipping too (seen as legitimate targets because they were financially backing the Iraqis). With one-fifth of the world’s oil travelling through the Gulf, this brought the American navy into the war, protecting Saudi and Kuwaiti shipping in the Gulf, as well as Iraqi ships. In the process, the Americans destroyed most of the Iranian navy. Tragically, as we noted in another episode, it also shot down an Iranian passenger plane bound for Dubai killing all 290 people on board (the Americans thought they were firing at an Iranian fighter aircraft).
Partly as a result of the Western support for Iraq, the Iranians finally agreed to a ceasefire in August, 1988. They were in no position to carry on the fight. War with America was a real possibility, the flow of volunteers, the martyrs glad to die for the revolution, was dwindling, and their economy was in ruins. Iraq, was in trouble too, but the support it was receiving meant that Iran needed to bring the war to an end more than Iraq did. The Western powers, hadn’t wanted to leave Iraq the undisputed leading power in the region, but it certainly hadn’t wanted a victory for Khomeini and his revolution.
Consequences of the Iran-Iraq War
We’ve been looking at the Iran-Iraq war and I’m going to wrap things up this week by looking at some of its consequences.
The rest of the region and the world beyond had been sucked in to the conflict. Most of the Arab states, but notably the Sunni rulers, supported Iraq. They were concerned that, should Iran win, the ‘Khomeini revolution’ would spread. An Iraqi regime loyal to Khomeini would be established, and the Shiite minorities in their own countries would be encouraged to rise up against them. Consequently, Saudi Arabia and the smaller oil-rich Gulf States, as well as Egypt and Jordan, supplied money and arms to Iraq. Jordan also supplied a route for Iraq’s imports and exports through the Jordanian port of Aqaba. With Iraq cut off from its own ports, this was a vital supply route.
The overriding concern for Western powers was to ensure the flow of oil, and to achieve that they needed stability in the region, and to achieve that, they felt they needed to ensure a balance of power in the region. It was not that they supported Saddam, rather that they were all bitterly opposed to the Khomeini revolution and they feared the widespread disruption that would follow a victory for Khomeini, not least what would happen to world oil prices if he won. France became the main non-Arab supplier of arms to Iraq, though the Soviet Union also gave substantial military hardware, including their latest tank and MiG-29’s. The Americans used satellite technology to keep the Iraqi’s informed of Iranian troop movements. They supplied him with arms, including the equipment that allowed Saddam to develop chemical weapons, and turned a blind eye when they were used against the Iranians. As we have noted, America also provided protection for Iraqi shipping, as well as Kuwaiti and Saudi ships.
Syria, however, because of its intense rivalry with Iraq, supported Iran. The Syrians shut off the Iraqi pipelines which passed through its territory and in return, Syria received Iranian oil for free. It helps explain what would later happen in Syria.
As I’ve said, it had been one of the longest and most destructive wars since WW2. There was terrible brutality on both sides. The ‘War of the Cities’ had meant that many civilians were amongst the casualties and there was massive destruction which only added to the suffering..
The Iranian economy was in ruins, indeed it faced bankruptcy. Its oil revenues had more-or-less halved to $10 billion. The living standards of Iranians were severely worse than before the war. But it had a population of 55 million and was still a major Gulf power. And Khomeini, who died a year after the war ended, was still revered by millions of Iranians for standing up to the West and then to the Iraqi invasion. A staggering twelve million people filled the streets of Tehran for his funeral. He had ended Iran’s humiliation after years of foreign interference. But he had not succeeded in exporting his revolutionary Shiite brand of Islam.
And we should note that Iran’s leadership today was forged in the Iran-Iraq war. Ayaltollah Khamenei, who replaced Khomeini as its Supreme Leader, was Iran’s president during the war. Its president today, Hassan Rouhanni was the commander-in-chief of Iran’s Air Defence. What is maybe more important is that the war helped cement the Iranian psyche, its special mission and its sense of isolation even amongst fellow-Muslim states. Another thing that came out of the war was that Iran established Hezbolah in Lebanon. And since it’s creation in 1982, Hezbollah has become one of the chief means of keeping the Iranian revolution alive elsewhere in the region, spreading its own influence across the Gulf and the Middle East more generally. Iran and its proxies, if they haven’t been able to impose fundamentalist regimes in the region, they have been able to initiate terrorist attacks starting in 1981 when the Iraqi Shi’a Islamist group al-Dawa, with financial and military assistance from Iran, carried out a suicide car bombing targeting the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. The explosion destroyed the embassy, killing 61 people and injuring at least 100 others. Then, in 1983, a suicide rammed his truck into the American embassy in Beirut killing sixty-three people and injuring more than a hundred more, and later the same year another suicide bomber drove another truck full of explosives into the American Marine barracks in Beirut killing 241 Marines with more than 100 others wounded. These were just the first such attacks – there would be many more.
Iraq’s economy, and its people, suffered too. With more and more money devoted to the war, accounting for almost all of Iraq’s imports, spending on things like education and health was reduced. With less money spent on health, life expectancy fell and infant mortality increased. Iraq faced huge debts of $80 billion at a time when its oil revenues had more than halved to $11 billion. Yet rather than rebuilding the country, which Saddam had promised, he kept a million men in arms (the fourth largest army in the world) and spent huge sums on building more advanced weapons. For example, Iraq had more tanks and aircraft than Britain and France combined. And ominously, Iraq finished the war with more fighter aircraft, helicopters, artillery and tanks than Iran. Iraqi’s were promised peace and prosperity at the end of the war, but instead of investment in social projects such as housing, schools and hospitals, they faced further hardship and more terror. There was no post-war recovery. But Saddam would be tempted to go to war again.
So, the consequences rippled out – from Iran and Iraq, to the region as a whole and to the wider world – if, like the pebble in the pond, with weakening effects. But do remember the point I never tire of making: ultimately history is always about people.
I said last week that the Iran-Iraq war is almost a forgotten war and that it shouldn’t be. I hope you can see that even more clearly now