Why were both America and the Soviet Union so interested in Cuba?

Why does a poor Caribbean island that grows sugar cane and tobacco leaves and provides relaxed holidays on sun-kissed beaches come to be at the centre of the world’s attention for a week in October, 1962? For in the week following President Kennedy’s televised announcement on October 22nd which informed the American people, and so the world, that the Soviet Union had placed nuclear missiles on a Caribbean island, the gravest crisis the world had known, a crisis that could have led to a nuclear Armageddon, and a crisis that did lead a good colleague of mine to be born prematurely (or so he claims) unfolded as the world prayed for a peaceful outcome.

The Caribbean island, of course, is Cuba and I don’t mean to be patronising or insulting. I have been to Cuba and fell in love with its music, its dancing, its people (and I bet you didn’t know but it boasts the smallest bird in the world – a lovely hummingbird – which I saw). But still, why did it almost bring about a nuclear Armageddon, why were America and the Soviet Union so interested in it?

The answer is easier as far as America is concerned. It is firstly a matter of geography: Cuba sits just 160 kilometres off the Florida coast. Secondly, it is a matter of history for Cuba had gained its independence from Spain in 1898 but it swapped one form of colonial rule for another. Cuba might have been an independent sovereign state but it was so economically tied to America as to
almost be its 51 st state.

And so it was about money too. Americans owned over 80% of Cuban oil refineries, copper mines and cattle ranches, and 70% of arable land including tobacco plantations and most of its sugar industry. Cuba was obliged to sell its resources cheaply to the American market and to buy American goods in return (three-quarters of Cuba’s imports came from America). The Cuban railways and its telephone system were run by America. The American Mafia also ran lucrative drugs, gambling and prostitution rackets. Cuba was a holiday destination for many Americans (those sun-kissed beaches). The American navy
also had an important base on the island at Guantanamo Bay.

To properly understand the game Khrushchev was playing, we need to get a little technical about nuclear weapons. Not too technical, I couldn’t cope, but a little. The important thing is to understand the different strategic roles played by short-range missiles, medium-range missiles, intermediate or long-range
missiles and inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). And to understand the importance of time. Short-range missiles can reach targets up to about 1,000 kilometres away. Medium-range missiles could reach targets up to approximately 3,000 kilometres away; intermediate or long range missiles up to
approximately 6,000 kilometres away, and ICBMs, as their name suggests, can reach across continents. But the other key factor in our consideration is time: short-range or medium-range missiles would reach their targets in no more than ten minutes, inter-mediate or long range missiles in about twenty minutes, and
ICBMs in about 30-35 minutes. Why this is important is the time it gives the other side to respond and fire back. The whole concept of MAD, mutually assured destruction, was that if one side fires its weapons, the other side will fire back.

This is where the time factor comes into play, because the time needed to launch an ICBM is about 5 minutes (you will appreciate that a launch has to go through a few checks first). Given the likely gravity of a launch scenario, there is never a lot of decision-making time, but clearly launching an ICBM gives the other side, enough time to retaliate. They won’t prevent the obliteration of
themselves but they will at least have the satisfaction of obliterating the enemy: MAD. And one would hope that the enemy would be less likely to initiate an ICBM ‘first strike’ knowing that the other side could launch medium-range and
intermediate-range missiles from different sites, striking at the huge populations in the enemy’s major cities. However, a strategic advantage could be gained for if a medium or intermediate-range missile attack can knock out the enemy’s
communication systems or their ICBM silos, then an ICBM strike can be launched with a much-reduced capacity for the other side to strike back (there will always be a strike back – remember, both sides have submarines and planes, permanently in flight, that could strike back even if all the ICBMs were
destroyed which itself would be doubtful). That is why Soviet medium and intermediate-range range missiles in Cuba was a potential game changer.

And back in 1962, Khrushchev was particularly riled by the fact that America had fifteen Jupiter medium-range missiles positioned in Turkey and another thirty in Italy (they also had sixty Thor medium range missiles in Britain). These could reach deep into Soviet territory, reaching cities such as Stalingrad,
Leningrad and Moscow, as well as Soviet command posts and missile sites. Why shouldn’t the Soviet Union have the same in Cuba? The Soviet Union was now a friend of Cuba, buying its sugar and providing it with necessities and with the means of defending itself. For that is what the world would be told if it
found out about them: they were positioned in Cuba purely as a defensive measure, not as a balance to America’s rockets in Turkey, Italy and Britain. Sixty-four SS-4 and SS-5 missiles were to be positioned on nine sites in north-west Cuba.

In reality, placing missiles on Cuba gave Khrushchev a number of options, political and military. As we have just noted, he could argue that they were placed in order to defend Cuba. However, nuclear missiles weren’t necessary and certainly not missiles of such a range. But they could be used to test America: would America back off or would it stand firm? If it backed off, it would be a propaganda victory for the Soviet Union as well as establishing a highly significant strategic advantage in America’s backyard. It would also mean that America would be highly unlikely to launch a ‘first strike’ nuclear attack as the Soviet Union would be able use its missiles in Cuba, as well as its own ICBMs in order to strike back. If it came to a face-off between the two
sides, Khrushchev would have a stronger hand to play and could negotiate the removal of America’s missiles in Turkey and Italy.

So, back to why Cuba was important to America. In 1823 President Monroe declared that America would no longer accept European colonialism in the Americas. It was a “hands off” our continent warning and it came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine. Presidents since Monroe, hadn’t hesitated to apply the
doctrine. Whilst in the context of the Cold War, America had not faced a threat in its own backyard, and when it did, with the Cuban Missile Crisis, it felt it simply had to respond firmly, or what message would it send? If it wasn’t prepared to defend its own backyard, would it move to protect its allies in Asia, the Middle East, Europe or anywhere else in the world?